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In offering a form of civil redress to the victims of international
human rights violations, litigation under the Alien Tort Statute1
("ATS") has come to reflect in microcosm the ways that international
law and practice have changed in the last half century. Specifically,
the successful ATS cases since the Second Circuit's seminal decision in
2 illustrate the blurring of certain structural
Fildrtiga v. Peia-Irala
distinctions that had long given international law its characteristic
shape, especially the distinctions between public and private
international law, between treaties and custom, between state and
nonstate actors, between international and domestic law, and between

1.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) [hereinafter referred to as ATS, Act, or Section 1350]. The ATS,
a short and once obscure provision of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. 73, 77 (1789), provides that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." Section 1350 has also been referred to as the "Alien Tort Claims Act," but
nothing of substance turns on the manipulation of the popular name, and in this Article, I will
follow the Supreme Court and refer to the provision as the "Alien Tort Statute." Sosa v. AlvarezMachian (Alvarez-MachainII), 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004).
The original version of the Alien Tort Statute provided in relevant part that the district
courts shall "have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit
courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." Id. Until the early twentieth century, the term "law
of nations"
now supplanted by the term "customary international law"
was used to denote
the customary rules and obligations that regulated interactions between states and certain
aspects of state interaction with individuals. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, Introductory Note (1987).
2.
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Fildrtiga,a Paraguayan national was tortured to death
by Pefia-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion. Id. at 878. Pefia came to the United
States, where Dolly Fildrtiga, the victim's sister, and Joel Fildrtiga, the victim's father, invoked
the ATS and sought damages. Id. at 878-79. The Fildrtigas were plainly aliens, and death by
torture was plainly a tort, so the only litigated issue was whether a government's torture of its
own citizens constitutes a "violation of the law of nations" or not. Id. at 880. The trial court
dismissed the case citing the traditional rule that a state's treatment of its own nationals was
not within the reach of international law. Id. at 878. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
deliberate torture under color of official authority violates international law.
Id.
One
distinguished commentator has considered the Fildrtiga decision to be the international human
rights movement's Brown v. Board of Education, Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991), but as shown below there is good reason to resist the
analogy between these two dramatic moments in American legal history
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lex lata and lex ferenda.3 But in the aftermath of the epochal attacks
of September 11, 2001, the modest progress made by international
human rights litigators in Fildrtiga and its progeny has been
threatened by the same forces that undermine the recognition of
domestic civil rights, particularly through the executive branch's
broad claims to law-free zones of power.
The broadest critiques of the ATS have been that the private
litigation of human rights violations complicates the war on terrorism,
that it amounts to "plaintiffs' diplomacy" by interfering with executive
branch prerogatives in foreign affairs, and that it threatens to impose
a uniquely American form of liability on multinational corporations for
their alleged complicity in human rights violations by the
governments with which they do business. The narrower critique has
centered on the more technical assertion that the ATS is purely
jurisdictional and provides no private right of action; in other words,
Congress must adopt additional legislation implementing an
international human rights norm before it can be litigated under
Section 1350. The ATS has also provided fresh context for decades-old
battles over the constitutional status of international law, the scope of
the self-executing treaty doctrine, and the problem of proving the
4
content of customary international law.
3.
See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalizationof Domestic Law, in THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 3, 5-28 (Ralph G. Steinhardt and Anthony D'Amato
eds., 1999).
4.
See, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary
InternationalLaw: The Role of Non-governmental Organizationsin U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 240, 241 (2004) (arguing that the ATS creates self-interested incentives for the
production of international law); Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Reconciling Political
Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade: Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and Private
Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 305, 327-28 (2003) (cautioning that an increase in ATS litigation
could mean disinvestment in developing markets by multinational corporations on a large scale);
Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457,
458 (2001) (discussing the hidden political and economic costs of ATS litigation); David J.
Bederman, InternationalLaw Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475, 476 (2001)
(responding to issues raised by Professor Bradley and arguing that "far from being an elitist,
moralist, and legalist phenomenon, ATS litigation may actually reflect the very best in American
foreign policy values."); Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global
Economy, 42 COLUJM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153, 153 (2003) (arguing that U.S. interests are
buttressed by holding multinational corporations accountable for human rights violations in U.S.
Courts); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to
Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 170 (2004) (analyzing the Bush
administration's opposition to ATS litigation); Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute
Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1001, 1004 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be retained
and utilized by the courts in ATS litigation); Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw as a Part of
Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2001) (exploring the
"international-law-as-federal-law" debate); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International
Labor Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203, 209
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In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I1), 5 the
Supreme Court resolved the most basic of these issues, but muddled
others likely to arise in future litigation. To the extent that it adhered
to doctrine dating to the founding of the Republic, the Court effectively
put alien tort litigation where it was after Fildrtiga and before
exaggerated interpretations of the ATS by its critics gained a patina of
academic legitimacy. The Court's analysis was largely consistent with
the lower courts' routine approach to ATS cases-distinguishing
frivolous from meritorious claims under international law, 6 allowing
the latter to proceed to trial and judgment 7, and, in appropriate
circumstances, dismissing cases under the Foreign Sovereign
8
Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine, or forum non conveniens.
For over two centuries, the ATS has rarely but consistently
been interpreted to authorize the federal courts to hear and resolve
claims of violations of the law of nations sounding in tort without
further Congressional action, including in recent years violations of
fundamental, well-defined human rights, such as the right to be free
from torture and genocide. Since 1984, some defendants have argued
that an additional express cause of action should be required for suits
under the ATS, 9 but every lower court to address the argument had
rejected it,10 and the Supreme Court had consistently denied certiorari
(2004) (arguing that the ATS should be used as a way of giving force to international labor
agreements); Michael G. Collins, The Diversity Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
649, 651 (2002) (arguing that the ATS should not be read as requiring alienage diversity in all
cases).
5.
124 S. Ct.. 2739 (2004). In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, (Alvarez-Machain1), the
Supreme Court ruled that the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico
did not prohibit the abduction of a Mexican national from Mexican territory for trial in the
United States on charges that arose in Mexico. 504 U.S. 669, 670 (1992). In Alvarez-Machain II,
as detailed below, the Court endorsed the interpretation of the ATS adopted in Fildrtigaand its
progeny, which allowed claims for tortious violations of international norms that are "specific,
universal, and obligatory." 124 S. Ct. at 2766. The Court did not question any case in which this
standard had been found to be satisfied, other than the arbitrary arrest claim advanced by
Alvarez-Machain himself, which the Supreme Court rejected. Id. at 2769.
6.
See infra notes 93-110 and accompanying text.
7.
See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Marcos
Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322
(N.D. Ga. 2002); Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez-Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
8.
See infra Part II.B.4.
9.
At least two circuit judges, writing only for themselves in cases separated by twenty
years in a single circuit, have accepted this argument. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145-47 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., concurring), rev'd
on othergrounds, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698-99 (2004) (holding that district court had
jurisdiction to hear the Habeas Corpus and ATS claims of some foreign nationals held by the
United States' military at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base).
10. Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 103-06 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001); Beanal v.
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in those cases. The necessity of an additional cause of action was,
however, the controlling issue in Alvarez-Machain II, and the Court
held conclusively that no additional statutory cause of action was
necessary to bring Fildrtiga-like actions under ATS.
This was
precisely as the lower courts had uniformly held. Citing Fildrtiga
repeatedly with approval, the Supreme Court also adopted a strict
rule of evidence for proving a "violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States" that is entirely consistent with the body of
lower court decisions under the ATS, requiring that the norm be
"specific, universal, and obligatory."'" In addition, by clarifying that
the courts of the United States have the doctrinal machinery
necessary to protect themselves ad hoc from frivolous or inconvenient
litigation and from cases that unacceptably compromise the
constitutional powers of the executive branch, the Court rejected the
argument from Sosa and his amici, including the government, that
these case-by-case concerns erected some prophylactic barrier to ATS
litigation.
But if the court concluded that the hard-line critique of the
ATS was more caricature than portrait, it also expressed itself
through a rhetoric of restraint, cautioning courts against an expansive
reading of the statute and requiring courts in future litigation to
determine which human rights claims "rest on the norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."'12 As shown below, that sense of
caution is nothing new; it reflects traditional best practices in the
irreducibly impressionistic process by which courts have proved the
content of customary international law for centuries. It assures that
Alvarez-Machain I will provoke more litigation than it resolved,

Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999); Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1005 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1126 (1995); In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 972 (1993); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond, Co., 256 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Cabello, 157 F. Supp..2d at 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp..2d 424, 441-43 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama v. Immigration
Naturalization Serv., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front,
993 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul
v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709
(N.D. Cal. 1988).
11. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machian (Alvarez-MachainII), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765-66 (2004).
12. Id. at 2765.
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especially given the ongoing evolution of international human rights
law. 13
On the other hand, the Court also introduced a profoundly
retrograde element by offering a counter-historical interpretation of
certain human rights instruments that is at odds with the evolved
position of the courts and the U.S. government. As a consequence, the
Court misapplied its own evidentiary standard to the conduct at issue
in the case, finding that the norm prohibiting Alvarez-Machain's
abduction and arrest did not yet qualify as a binding obligation under
"the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." In short, when
the Court broke with its own traditions, it innovated implausibly and
with unfortunate results.
Given the aggressive positions staked out by Sosa and his
amici against Fildrtiga,human rights activists may consider AlvarezMachain H a victory in the sense that escaping a fire is a victory (even
as it was squarely a defeat for Alvarez-Machain himself), but the
impact of the decision on future litigation remains a matter of
reasoned speculation. After a brief orientation to the litigation itself
in Part I, this Article locates Alvarez-Macha II within the traditional
international jurisprudence of the Court, especially with respect to its
foundational decision in The Paquete Habana.14 The Article then
identifies the issues that Alvarez-Machain H resolved and describes
the likely trajectory of issues that remain open for further
development by the courts, including the possibility of aiding-andabetting liability and corporate liability for complicity in human rights
abuse. In the aftermath of the decision, Congress, having already
expanded the ATS once, 15 may be invited to legislate answers to the
questions that remain under the statute after Alvarez-Machain I.
13. See Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[C]ourts must interpret
international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the
world today."). As Justice Story observed in United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832,
846 (D. Mass. 1822), "[i]t does not follow.... that because a principle cannot be found settled by
the consent or practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period
the principle can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations."
14.

175 U.S. 677 (1900).

15. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, extended Fildrtigato U.S.
citizens with certain procedural limitations, but Congress clearly endorsed the possibility of ATS
claims beyond the Fildrtiga claims and saw no need to alter the statute to accommodate them:
"claims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may
appropriately be covered by section 1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based
on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international
law." H.R. Rep. No. 367, 102nd Cong. 1st Sess., pt 1 (1991) (emphasis supplied). It cannot be
argued that subsequent legislative history is controlling authority in determining a prior
Congress's intent, but the Supreme Court has observed that subsequent action by Congress
"should not be rejected out of hand as a source that a court may consider in the search for
legislative intent." Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980).
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This Article closes with a legislative proposal to assure that the ATS
remains a viable, modest vehicle for the vindication of international
human rights, by balancing the interests of human rights plaintiffs,
the government, and defendants.
I. THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN LITIGATION
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was
abducted from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, held
incommunicado and transported to El Paso, Texas, where he was
arrested the next day for his alleged participation in the torture and
murder of Kiki Camarena, a federal drug enforcement agent, and
Camarena's pilot, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar. According to the record in
the case, whatever authorization existed for this operation came from
the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") and not from the President of the United States, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of State, or any other member of the cabinet.
According to his own sworn testimony, not even then-DEA
Administrator Jack Lawn was aware of the operation. 16 Despite
subsequent characterizations by the government, the motivation for
the operation was the extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. criminal
law and not the neutralization of a terrorist threat or any other
national security concern.1 7 The United States never initiated a
request for the extradition of Dr. Alvarez-Machain under the bilateral
Extradition Treaty between Mexico and the United States. The
government of Mexico formally protested the kidnapping,1 8 and both
16. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 601, 642 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003), reversed by 124
S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
17. The war on terrorism has been prosecuted through transnational abductions without
raising the same legal concerns because even a state-sponsored abduction does not violate "the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States" if it occurs inter alia on the high seas or other
territories beyond any state's national jurisdiction, see, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d
1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that the FBI and the Navy are authorized to assist in the
arrest of a terrorism suspect in international waters); or with the consent of the territorial state,
see, e.g. Kasi v Angelone, 300 F.3d 487, 499-500 (4th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1025 (2002)
(Pakistan did not object to the abduction of a terrorist suspect); United States v. Walczak, 783
F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a search by United States Customs agents conducted
at a Canadian airport pursuant to an international agreement between the United States and
Canada); or without the participation of the United States government, see, e.g., United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988) (defendant arrested by Mexican officials);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (U.S. agents not directly involved in
abduction). Ironically, much of the Bush Administration's attack on the ATS in the context of
terrorism derives from Judge Robert Bork's separate concurrence in a 1984 case, dismissing an
ATS claim in which plaintiffs attempted to recover damages from terrorists for a terrorist attack.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
18. Brief for the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 91-712), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 934 (1992).
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the federal district court and the court of appeals directed that Dr.
Alvarez-Machain be repatriated because the abduction violated the
treaty. 19
The Supreme Court reversed (Alvarez-Machain 1).20 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
extradition treaty did not by its terms prohibit state-sponsored
kidnapping as an alternative to formal extradition procedures. Nor did
the norms of territorial integrity in customary international law
support an inferred prohibition in the treaty, since these normswhich prohibit the exercise of enforcement authority by one state in
the territory of another without consent-were insufficiently related to
the conduct at issue and were within the executive branch's discretion
to protect or not. The majority concluded that, because there was no
underlying treaty violation, the judiciary lacked authority to inquire
into the circumstances under which Dr. Alvarez-Machain was brought
to this country, an asserted consequence of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine of
21
federal common law.

Once it had been determined that Dr. Alvarez-Machain could
not successfully challenge the means of his rendition, he went to trial
in United States District Court in Los Angeles. On December 14,
1992, Judge Edward Rafeedie, who had sentenced other defendants to
life in prison for their roles in the death of Camarena and Zavala-

19. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 614 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub nom.,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991).
20. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992).
21. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Far from
fitting within the Ker-Frisbie line of cases, the decision in Alvarez-Machain I actually
represented a radical expansion of the doctrine, which had evolved almost exclusively in the
context of interstate abductions, not state-sponsored international abductions. In Ker, a U.S.
citizen who had fled to Peru to escape embezzlement charges was forcibly returned to the United
States by a private security guard. Id. at 438-39. Though the guard carried extradition papers
within the framework of the 1870 extradition treaty between the United States and Peru, the
seizure itself was made outside the formal treaty procedures, and the U.S. government was not
involved in any way in Ker's kidnapping, unlike Alvarez-Machain's case; indeed, according to the
Court itself, Ker's abduction "was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominion of Peru,
without any pretense of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United States."
Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. In addition, unlike Mexico in Alvarez-Machain I, neither Peru nor Chile,
which partially occupied Peru at the time, protested the abduction. Charles Fairman, Ker v.
Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 685 (1953). Frisbie and its progeny involved instances of
abductions in which neither a treaty nor international law generally was even peripherally
involved. Under the United States Constitution and the Extradition Act, States of the Union
lack the discretion to decline the extradition of their citizens solely on the basis of their
citizenship. U.S. CONST. art. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (2002). They had in other words given up the
very rights of sovereignty asserted by Mexico in Alvarez-Machain I. Logically, no line of cases
dealing with domestic kidnappings or kidnappings without government participation can
determine the effect of a state-sponsored violation in violation of another state's territorial
sovereignty.
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Avelar, 22 directed a verdict of acquittal, noting that the prosecution of
Dr. Alvarez-Machain was based on "wild speculation" and "hunches"
that did not add up to sufficient evidence of his participation in the
crime. 23 After his acquittal, Dr. Alvarez-Machain invoked the ATS
and sued Francisco Sosa, a former Mexican police officer who had been
one of the kidnappers and who was then in the federal witness
24
protection program.
The facts concerning Alvarez-Machain's treatment during the
abduction were disputed at trial, but it was not disputed that he was
taken from his medical office, driven away in an unmarked car, held
against his will in a motel in another town, prevented from contacting
his family until after he reached the United States, and finally turned
over to waiting DEA agents in Texas the following day. 25 The district
judge did not find Dr. Alvarez-Machain's testimony about his physical
treatment credible but awarded him $25,000 in damages because he
had suffered emotional distress as the result of a kidnapping "in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." A
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, 26 and the en banc panel narrowly affirmed, finding that
Alvarez-Machain's international human rights, especially his right to
27
be free of arbitrary arrest and detention, had been violated.
Rejecting the analysis advanced by Sosa, and the government as
amicus, not one of the eleven en banc judges, including the five

22. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Zuno-Arca, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
23. Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9thCir. 2003) (en banc).
24. It had been conceded that Sosa acted under color of official authority, United States v.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1990), but his motion to have the United States
substituted as defendant under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000), was denied, and he did
not appeal that disposition. The United States was substituted as a defendant for all of the other
individual defendants, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled en banc that federal officers
and the United States can only be sued for torts in violation of the law of nations under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), which waives sovereign immunity in suits
"for ... personal injury... resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." AlvarezMachain 331 F.3d at, 631. The Supreme Court ruled that the FTCA's exception for claims
"arising in a foreign country," 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000), bars claims based on any injury
suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred, thereby
rejecting the so-called "headquarters doctrine," under which various circuit courts had found the
foreign country exception inapplicable to planning and direction decisions made by government
agents in the United States. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain II), 124 S. Ct. 2739,
2754 (2004).
25. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
26. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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dissenters, adopted the argument that an explicit cause of action was
required in addition to the grant of jurisdiction in the ATS.
The case returned to the Supreme Court, which reversed on
other grounds. The Court concluded that the ATS was a purely
jurisdictional statute that created no new causes of action, but it did
not follow, as the government had urged, that Congress was required
to take additional action before the statute could be invoked. "There is
too much in the historical record to believe that Congress would have
enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely." 28 To the
contrary:
[Flederal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant was on the books,
because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within the
common law at the time .... The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability
29
at the time.

The contemporaneous historical record, especially the writings
of Blackstone, suggested that these norms included the "violation of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy. ''30 By citing Fildrtiga with approval, the Court established
that ATS actions are no longer limited to those specific wrongs, though
their legal status in the late 18th-century clearly informs the rule of
evidence that should govern future ATS proceedings:
[C]ourts should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
31
recognized.

The Court did not identify a defining characteristic of these "18thcentury paradigms," nor did it define the "ultimate criteria for
accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under §1350,"32

28 Alvarez-Machai II, 124 S. Ct. at 2758-59.
29. Id. at 2761. Contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion, Alvarez-Machain did not argue
that the ATS qualified "as authority for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation
of the law of nations," a position the Court then dismiss as "implausible." Id. at 2755. Instead,
Alvarez-Machain took the position that the ATS "authorizes the federal courts to hear and
resolve claims of tortious violations of the law of nations without further Congressional action."
Brief for the Respondent at 7, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339). "Nor
is it unusual, unprecedented, imprudent, or unconstitutional for federal courts to fashion
common law principles to govern those aspects of [ATS] litigation not governed by the express
Congressional incorporation of tort law and the 'law of nations.' " Id. at 29. These positions are
entirely consistent with the Court's analysis, which makes its articulation of a more aggressive
argument and its attribution of the argument to Alvarez-Machain particularly tendentious.
30. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
31. Id. at 2761-62.
32. Id. at 2765.
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preferring instead to approve the formulations in various lower court
33
decisions and opinions.
The Court grounded the inherently discretionary judgment
about the actionable norms of international law in the common law
making powers and traditions of the federal judiciary, clarifying again
that the pronouncement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that "[t]here is no
federal general common law" 34 should not be over interpreted.
Although Erie requires the federal courts to be cautious "before
exercising innovative authority over substantive law" 35 without
legislative guidance, the Court has repeatedly explained that an
entirely legitimate federal common law exists in various "havens of
37
specialty"36 or interstitial areas of particular federal interest,
including international law.3 8 Thus, the Court in Alvarez-Machain II
both adhered to Erie's conception of limited judicial power to
articulate federal "general" common law and established that the
courts' derivation of certain international human rights norms in ATS
litigation would not violate the separation of powers. Certainly,
nothing in Alvarez-Machain I questions, let alone undermines, the
legitimacy of Fildrtiga,because the threshold evidentiary rule as to
the content of international law, namely the prohibition of torture,
had been fully satisfied in that case.

33. Id. at 2765-66 (citing: Filartiga, ('[Flor purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
become--like the pirate and slave trader before him--hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind'); Tel-Oren, supra, at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the 'limits of
section 1350's reach be defined by 'a handful of heinous actions--each of which violates definable,
universal and obligatory norms'); see also In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (C.A.9 1994) ('Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is
specific, universal, and obligatory')."); see also infra text accompanying notes 93-110.
34. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
35. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
36. Id.
37. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979) (stating that priority of
liens stemming from federal lending programs must be determined by federal law fashioned by
the federal courts); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(stating that jurisdictional grant allows federal common law to govern the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements).
38. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-26 (1964) (stating that
federal common law determines the scope of the act of state doctrine, which bars courts from
inquiring as to the propriety of acts of a foreign government within its own territory); Texas
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (stating that "international
disputes implicating ...our relations with foreign nations" qualify as one of the "narrow areas"
in which "federal common law" survives Erie). See generally Phillip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to InternationalLaw, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743 (1939) ( "It
would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for
pronouncing the rules of international law.").
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In oracular language that is certain to be quoted by both
plaintiffs and defendants in future ATS cases, however, the Court
observed that:
[T]he judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar
subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today. Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no
matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified limited
enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way.
For two centuries we have 3 9affirmed that the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations.

The Court said that it would "welcome any congressional
guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to
affect foreign relations" and made it clear that criteria other than the
nature of the asserted norm might affect the justiciability of a case,
including a potential exhaustion-of-remedies requirement and
statements of interest from the executive branch. 40 Critically, the
litigation position of the United States in Alvarez-Machain I!-that
the ATS complicated its political life and the war on terrorism-did
not create a per se barrier to Fildrtiga-likeactions.
Immediately following Alvarez-Machain II, some ATS activists
declared that they had won the war and lost the battle-the ATS had
been preserved against its most concerted attack in a quarter-century,
but Alvarez-Machain had lost his case. According to the Court, the
norm at the heart of Alvarez-Machain's claim was insufficiently
specific to apply unambiguously to his case. As the court reasoned, the
norm against arbitrary arrest was contained in two international
instruments-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR" or
"the Declaration") 4' and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR")42-which, "despite their moral authority,
'43
have little utility under the standard set out in this opinion.
Because the Declaration was non-binding at its inception and because
the ICCPR was understood to be non-self-executing at the time of its
ratification by the United States, they "cannot establish the relevant
39. Alvarez-Machain I 124 S. Ct. at 2764. Even though modern conceptions of lawincluding common law and international law-differ markedly from the natural law orientation
of the late eighteenth century, fidelity to legislative supremacy compelled the Court in AlvarezMachain II to preserve the ATS by adapting the original understanding to modern times: "We
think it would be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected federal
courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the
common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism." Id. at 2765.
40. Id. at 2764 n.21.
41. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
42. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
43. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2767.
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and applicable rule of international law." 44 Nor was the Court
convinced that the prohibition of arbitrary arrest as applied to
Alvarez-Machain had attained the status of customary international
law. To arrive at this conclusion it had to deploy a strategic
recharacterization of Alvarez-Machain's claim, viewing it as the
assertion that the arrest was arbitrary solely because no applicable
law authorized it and not because it infringed the sovereignty of
Mexico:
Alvarez thus invokes a general prohibition of "arbitrary" detention defined as officially
sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization4 to
detain under the domestic law of
5
some government, regardless of the circumstances.

As shown below, this amounts to a "strawman" version of AlvarezMachain's actual claims, and the Court had little difficulty
dismantling it, finding the implications of such a norm
46
"breathtaking."
The more persuasive rationale for the Court's result may rest
in its analysis of Section 702 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), which lists a
customary international human rights norm against prolonged
arbitrary detention. According to the Court:
Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary detention that the civilized
world accepts as binding customary international law requires a factual basis beyond
relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority ...Whatever may be said for
the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect world, it expresses an
aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we
require.... [A] single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by a transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment,violates no norm of customary
47
internationallaw so well defined as to support the creationof a federal remedy.

The separate opinions in Alvarez-Machain II do nothing to
undermine the majority's endorsement of the Fildrtiga paradigm. To
the contrary, they preclude the repetition of certain arguments by
those who would attempt to dismantle the ATS in the future. In his
separate concurrence, for example, Justice Breyer endorsed the
majority's limitations on the recognition of a civil cause of action
under the ATS but would add the requirement that the norm fall

44. Id. As discussed below, the Court's handling of these authorities is erroneous and
remarkably anachronistic. See infra text accompanying note 188.
45. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2768.
46. Id. ("His rule... would create an action in federal court for arrests by state officers who
simply exceed their authority; and for any violation of any limit that the law of any country
might place on the authority of its own officers to arrest."). Id. For a discussion of AlvarezMachain's actual claim under international law, see infra text accompanying notes 181-182.
47. Id. at 2768-69 (emphasis supplied).
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within the universal criminal jurisdiction of states. 48 That no other
member of the Court endorsed such a requirement means that the
inclusion of a norm within a state's universal jurisdiction may be one
factor to consider in determining the norm's actionability under the
ATS, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy the standard.
Similarly, the partial concurrence of Justice Scalia, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas forcefully disputed the majority's
"reservation of a discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary to
create causes of action for the enforcement of international-law-based
norms," and concluded:
In today's latest victory for its Never Say Never Jurisprudence, the Court ignores its
own conclusion that the ATS provides only jurisdiction, wags a finger at the lower courts
for going too far, and then-repeating the same formula the ambitious lower courts
49
themselves have used-invites them to try again.

By making the self-styled "revisionist" approach to customary
international law central to his analysis, and by obtaining the votes of
only two additional justices, Justice Scalia effectively demonstrates
that the revisionist critique of the ATS was unpersuasive and had
50
finally been laid to rest.

48. Id. at 2782-83 (Breyer, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Sosa's interpretation of the ATS had tracked the argumentation of the academic
"revisionists" on the status of customary international law as law of the United States, without
acknowledging the failure of this critique to convince any court that their position is correct. For
examples of this "revisionist" critique, see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001); Curtis Bradley, The Status of Customary InternationalLaw in U.S.
Courts-Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807 (1998); John C. Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1955 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999); Michael D. Ramsey, International
Law as Part of Our Law: A ConstitutionalPerspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 187 (2001). But see Ryan
Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filfirtiga's Firm Footing: InternationalHuman Rights and Federal
Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 513 (1997) (arguing that the Torture Victim Protection
Act serves as enabling legislation for the ATS, whether or not implementation is necessary);
Harold Hungju Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Law?, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1828-29
(1998) (rejecting the "revisionist" requirement that an unambiguous federal statute or treaty
enable customary international law); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
InternationalLaw: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371,
371-72 (1997) (same). As noted above, the "revisionist" critique, which had generated multiple
academic conferences and publications, was never accepted by any lower court with an ATS case
before it.
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II. A RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
A. Paquete Habana and the TraditionalDomestic Status of
Customary InternationalLaw
Alvarez-Machain II may be viewed as an unremarkable
reaffirmation of the traditional doctrine, famously articulated in
Paquete Habana,that "[i]nternational law is part of our law and must
be ascertained and administered by courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination."5 1 But Sosa and the government
had invoked Paquete Habana for two considerably more radical
propositions of law that undergirded their broad argument that Erie
illegitimates the application of customary international law in
Fildrtiga and its progeny. According to Sosa and his amici, Paquete
Habana meant that the courts of the United States could resort to the
law of nations only to resolve "otherwise authorized actions," such as
actions in federal maritime jurisdiction, and that customary norms are
binding only when the President assents to the application of the
norm. 52 When the courts go beyond these limitations, the argument
continued, they violate the basic limitations on the creation of federal
common law articulated in Erie.
These arguments are no longer viable after Alvarez-Machain
II, because both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
explicitly reaffirmed the orthodox legitimacy of international law as
law of the United States. In short, Alvarez-Machain II repudiates the
revisionist view of international law according to which ATS human
53
rights actions were intrinsically illegitimate.
To understand the doctrinal consequences of the AlvarezMachain I Court's careful reconciliation of Erie and Paquete Habana,
it is necessary to recall the facts of Paquete Habana. On April 21,
1898, the Secretary of the Navy instructed Admiral William Sampson,
then commanding the North Atlantic Squadron, to blockade the entire
north coast of Cuba. 54 The next day, the President proclaimed that
the United States would maintain the blockade "in pursuance of the
51. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
52. Brief of Petitioner at 29, 40-43, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I1), 124 S.
Ct.. 2379 (2004) (No. 03-339).
53. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 855-58 (criticizing the use of federal
common law to develop norms of international law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The
Current Illegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997)
(attacking the constitutionality and wisdom of ATS litigation).
54. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712-13 (1900).
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laws of the United States, and the law of nations applicable in such
cases."55 On April 25, Congress declared war on Spain and declared
that a state of war had existed for four days. 56 On April 26, the
President proclaimed that "it [was] desirable that such war should be
conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of
nations and sanctioned by their recent practice . . ...57 That recital
was followed by specific declarations of certain rules for the conduct of
the war by sea, but the proclamation was silent on whether civilian
fishing vessels might be seized as prize. 58 By that time, American
gunboats had already seized two civilian fishing vessels flying the
Spanish flag: the Paquete Habana and the Lola.59 On April 28,
Admiral Sampson telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy, seeking
permission to seize the crews of Spanish fishing vessels as prisoners of
war on the ground that they were:
... excellent seamen, belonging to the maritime inscription of Spain, who have already
served in the Spanish navy, and who are liable to further service.... [T]hese trained
men are naval reserves, have a semi-military character, and would be most valuable to

the Spaniards as artillerymen ....60

On April 30, the Secretary of the Navy replied: "Spanish
fishing vessels attempting to violate the blockade are subject, with
crew, to capture, and any such vessel or crew considered likely to aid
the enemy may be detained."' 6' Both fishing vessels were brought by
their captors into Key West and later condemned by the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida as prize, "the court not being
satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, treaty, or
proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from seizure. '62
Each vessel was then sold at auction, and the masters of the vesselsacting on behalf of the crew and the owners-appealed to the Supreme
63
Court.
The Court ruled that the captures were unlawful and without
probable cause, because the law of nations had evolved to the point
that domestic coastwise fishing vessels, when plying their trade, were
exempt from seizure as prize in times of war and because
55.

Proclamation No. 6, 30 Stat. 1769, 1769 (Apr. 22, 1898).

56.

Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712-13.

57. Proclamation No. 8, 30 Stat. 1770, 1770-71 (Apr. 26, 1898).
58 PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 712-13.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 712.
62. Id. at 679.
63. Id. at 712. At the Supreme Court, the United States was represented by the Assistant
Attorney General, and the captors were represented separately, although nothing in the report of
the case treats their submissions separately from that of the government. Id. at 678.
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international law applied in United States courts even in the absence
of Congressional enactment:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning
64
what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.

The Court affirmed the award of compensatory damages and denied
the claim for punitive damages. 65 Three justices dissented on the
ground that no international exemption rule had been proved to their
satisfaction and because the court should not review "action which
must be treated as having been taken in the ordinary exercise of
'66
discretion in the conduct of war.
The Court's careful invocation of Paquete Habana in AlvarezMachain 1 demonstrates that the Fildrtiga court's approach to
international law and the ATS after Erie was entirely correct, as
subsequent courts had routinely held. Indeed, it is possible to identify
multiple propositions that the Court's reaffirmation of Paquete
Habananecessarily entails.
First, it establishes that the executive branch's conduct of
wartime operations is justiciable when subcabinet federal officers
violate the law of nations. The government had argued in Paquete
Habana that discretionary executive decisions in wartime should not
be reviewed or "revised" by the courts. Only the dissent agreed, noting
that "the rule is that exemption from the rigors of war is in the control
of the Executive. He is bound by no immutable rule on the subject. It
is for him to apply, or to modify, or to deny altogether such immunity
'67
as may have been usually extended.
The majority found the case fully justiciable; indeed, the Court
felt itself not only authorized but obliged to apply the law of nations to
Admiral Sampson's decision to seize the vessels. That disposition was
fully consistent with the admonition many years later in Baker v.
Carr68 that the political question doctrine should apply when there are

64. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis supplied); see also Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 133 (1795); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398 (1964).
65. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 714.
66. Id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 721 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
68. 369 U.S. 186, 226-28 (1962).
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no judicially manageable standards for the court to apply. Obviously
as the policy element displaces the legal element of the case, it
becomes progressively non justiciable, but the converse is also true:
when there are legal standards to apply, there is progressively less
reason not to adjudicate the case. The fact that the Paquete Habana
court was sitting as the nation's highest prize court does not reduce
the significance of this decision, given the breadth of the court's ruling
that "[i]nternational law... must be ascertained and administered by
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."6 9
There is no suggestion whatever that only maritime or prize courts are
courts "of appropriate jurisdiction;" indeed, the bulk of the court's
jurisdictional discussion said nothing about prize or maritime
jurisdiction, addressing instead the meaning of then-recent legislation
that established the circuit courts of appeal and altered the Supreme
70
Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Second, a "controlling executive act" can displace the law of
nations and determine the rule of decision in a case, but not every
unlawful action by any member of the executive branch qualifies ipso
facto as a "controlling executive act." 71 If Admiral Sampson's decision
to seize the Spanish fishing crew had qualified as a "controlling
executive act," the case would have come out precisely the other way.
Nor can it be said that the President's proclamation controlled the
case, since the proclamation was explicit on several articles of war but
said nothing about fishing vessels. In addition, the government had
argued in Paquete Habana that the exemption norm was simply a
matter of comity and not law-a position with some authority behind
it from the Napoleonic Wars. The Supreme Court was not convinced
and rejected that position in these terms:
"[T]he period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply
sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom
or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of
civilized nations into a settled rule of international law. 72" As a
consequence, the challenged executive action-involving a seizure of
individuals in both Alvarez-Machain and Paquete Habana-need not
69. PaqueteHabana, 175 U.S. at 700.
70. See id. at 683 (interpreting the Act of March 3, 1891, 2 Stat. 244, as "nowhere
impos[ing] a pecuniary limit upon the appellate jurisdiction, either of this court or of the circuit
court of appeals, from a district or Circuit Court of the United States.").
71. Immediately after declaring that international law "must be ascertained and
administered by courts of appropriate jurisdiction," the Paquete Habana Court said: "[flor this
purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ...." 175 U.S. at 700.
72. Id. at 694.
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be treated as a "controlling executive act" if undertaken by a
Equally important, the government's
subordinate federal officer.
litigation position is not dispositive in the Court's effort to define the
content of international law.
Third, Alvarez-Machain II- via Paquete Habana-confirms
(albeit without defining) the status of the law of nations in U.S.
domestic law. The Court's interpretation of the ATS in AlvarezMachain II turned on the proposition that the law of nations, as an
enclave of federal common law, survived Erie and authorizes the
federal courts to hear cases and frame remedies under the Act as they
would any other common law cause of action, subject to a heightened
burden of proof. In this regard, Alvarez-Machain 1 confirms Paquete
Habana's axiomatic proposition that "international law is part of our
law"7 3 and does not require further implementation by statute, treaty,
or executive proclamation to be binding in domestic courts. The
Paquete HabanaCourt never referred to some cause of action provided
by Congress under which those seized in violation of the law of nations
could recover compensatory damages from the United States. Even
before Paquete Habana, the Court had conclusively foreclosed the
argument that customary international law depended for its domestic
enforceability on statutory authorization. 74 In The Nereide, for
example, the Supreme Court confirmed that customary international
law created enforceable rights even in the absence of Congressional
enactment or codification:
If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which
Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government will manifest that will by passing an
passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations
act for the purpose. Till such an act 7be
5
which is a part of the law of the land.

Customary international law was and remains an area in which no
affirmative legislative act is required to "authorize" its application in
76
U.S. courts.

73. Id. at 700. This axiom of American law has been questioned by a court only once in over
a century. In Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1159 n.4 (7th Cir. 2001),
Judge Manion suggested in a footnote that the common law on which Paquete Habana and
United States v. Smith rested was part of the federal general common law recognized in Swift v.
Tyson and rejected by Erie. The Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain II, following Fildcrtiga,
Kadic, and Marcos, inter alia, reasonably rejected the necessary and untenable implication that
international law is really state law. 124 S. Ct. at 2765-66.
74. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 209 (1796); Respublica v. De Longchamps,
1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
75. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (emphasis supplied).
76. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1561 (1984) ("International law... is 'self-executing' and is applied by courts in the United
States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented by Congress.").
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Fourth, Alvarez-Machain I reestablishes that it is the province
of the courts to determine when rules of comity or courtesy develop
into binding norms of customary international law, even if the
executive branch argues otherwise in a particular case. The opinion in
Paquete Habana demonstrates that the law of nations can and must
evolve, and that courts, in construing and applying the law as it
evolves, assure that the law of the United States conforms to current
international standards. As a result, far from embarrassing the
executive branch in the conduct of foreign relations by consulting
international standards, the common law courts reinforce the
assumption that this nation does not violate international standards
with impunity:
By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago and gradually
ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, have7 7been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes
and crews, from capture as prize of war.

Crucially, the norm existed not only "in the absence of any treaty or
other public act,"7 8 but also independently of the litigation position of
the executive branch, which had argued that the exemption norm was
strictly a matter of courtesy or humanitarianism and was distinctly
not law. As the Court has shown, there can be no blanket rule of
abject deference to the executive branch in the determination of rules
of international law.
Fifth, Paquete Habana established a strict evidentiary
standard for finding a customary norm, which Alvarez-Machain II
adapted to the ATS. According to the Paquete Habana court, because
there was "no complete collection of the instances illustrating" the
norm, it was "worth the while to trace the history of the rule, from the
earliest accessible sources, through the increasing recognition of it,
with occasional setbacks, to what we may now justly consider as its
final establishment in our own country and generally throughout the
civilized world. ' 79 In a methodologically telling display of historical
erudition, the Court traced the actual practice of states with regard to
coastwise fishing vessels to treaties and other forms of state practice
dating to the early fifteenth century.8 0 The Court also carefully
considered apparent exceptions to the putative norm:
77. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686 (emphasis supplied).
78. Id. at 708.
79. Id. at 686.
80. The Court's meticulous historical research confirms that the finding of custom is not a
license for judicial creativity in ATS cases or any other context. In order fully to prove the
content of the norm, the Court considered inter alia the edicts and practices of King Henry IV of
England (1403); a treaty of 1521 between Emperor Charles V and Francis I of France; Dutch
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Since the United States became a nation, the only serious interruptions, so far as we are
informed, of the general recognition of the exemption of coast fishing vessels from
hostile capture, arose out of the mutual suspicions
and recriminations of England and
81
France during the wars of the French Revolution.

The Court concluded, however, that these apparent exceptions
had been overcome by the consistency of state practice in the
intervening decades: "[T]he period of a hundred years which has since
elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have
rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the
general assent of civilized nations into a settled rule of international
law. '8 2
Evidently, advocates who would advance a customary
international law argument must first offer the court a compelling
tutorial in legal history.
With adjustments for the demise of natural law conceptions
and the expansion of human rights norms since World War II, that is
precisely the kind of history the Supreme Court expects successful
plaintiffs to proffer in future ATS litigation. In particular, plaintiffs
must prove that their claims "based on the present-day law of nations
... rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the
18th-century paradigms [the courts] have recognized. 8' 3 By offering
only examples of cases that would satisfy this rule of evidence, rather
than defining the rule itself or cataloging the actionable norms, the
Court signaled its expectation that the lower courts would address
these claims case-by-case. An ostensive definition is better than no
definition, but it remains for future cases to determine which human
rights norms pass the test, a task that is undertaken in the next
section.

edicts in 1536; a French compilation of maritime law dated 1661; agreements between Louis XIV
and the States General of Holland in 1675; a directive of June 5, 1779, in which Louis XVI
ordered his commanders to exempt English fishermen from seizure; a treaty between the United
States and Prussia dated 1785 and repeated in later treaties with Prussia dated 1799 and 1828;
a treaty between the United States and Mexico in 1848; the practice of the belligerents in the
Crimean War (1854); and the practice of the belligerents in conflicts between France and Austria
(1859), France and Germany (1870), and Japan and China (1894). Id. at 686-700.
81. Id. at 691.
82. Id. at 694.
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainI1), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762 (2004).
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B. TraditionalApproaches to the Implication of a Cause of Action
Under the ATS
1. "The 18th-Century Paradigms We Have Recognized": Best Practices
in Determining the Actionable Content of International Law
Alvarez-Machain I reaffirms Paquete Habana's methodical
approach to customary international law and thereby offers courts
critical guidance in applying the ATS in the future. On each
international law issue presented in Paquete Habana, the Court
looked for and found redundancy: state practice, treaties in consistent
form, statements and actions by governments, decisions of domestic
prize courts in various nations, and jurists summarizing the practice
of states and attesting to its legal status. Similarly, in United States
v. Smith,8 4 cited with approval in Alvarez-Machain II, the Court
determined that piracy had been defined by the law of nations "with
reasonable certainty" using similarly redundant authorities: "What
the law of nations on this subject is, may be ascertained by consulting
the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."8 5 What follows in Smith is an
encyclopedic analysis of these authorities in various nations and
languages.
In determining that international law prohibited a state from
torturing its own citizens, the Fildrtiga court engaged in a similarly
methodical and eclectic evidentiary process. It gave probative but
evidently not dispositive weight to a submission from the executive
branch in which the Departments of Justice and State assured the
court that "a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these
circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation's
commitment to the protection of human rights."8 6 The court also
considered the practice of states, including the condemnation of
torture in diplomatic exchanges and in the laws, constitutions, and
high court decisions of the various nations, which reinforced the
position of the United States government.8 7 The court's conclusion
was also grounded in the prohibition of torture in various treaties
around the world, invoked not because they were binding on the
84. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
85. Id. at 160-61.
86. Memorandum for the United States, Filrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980) [hereinafter Memo for U.S. in Fildrtiga].
87. Filirtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
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United States but because they qualified as evidence that other
nations of the world considered torture illegal.8 8
Additionally,
international organizations had adopted various resolutions and
declarations in consistent form, addressing legal issues, and accepted
by consensus or without significant opposition, establishing the
illegality of torture.8 9 Similarly authoritative were the submissions of
publicists that were consistent with the conclusion from these other
sources that a state's treatment of its own citizens was no longer a
matter of legitimate political diversity and had become a matter of
international law. 90 As in Paquete Habana, the Fildrtigacourt also
addressed the appearance of exceptions, noting that some states did
commit torture, but declined to allow that behavior-generally
unacknowledged and undefended-to undermine the legitimacy of the
international prohibition of torture; indeed, the defenses offered by
governments accused of torture constituted additional evidence of an
entrenched state practice establishing the illegality of torture. 91
Notably, these various authorities were not binding upon the
United States, but they were not for that reason deemed irrelevant.
Instead, they were authoritative in the impressionistic process of
determining the content of the law of nations and offered probative
evidence of the underlying norm.
Furthermore, no government
objected to the approach or the result in Fildrtiga,suggesting that the
court's reliance on these sources did not lead the court into error on
the dispositive issue of whether torture violated the "law of nations or
a treaty of the United States. ' 92 At bottom, the key principle-derived
from the Paquete Habana and reaffirmed in Alvarez-Machain II-is
that the law of nations is a modest body of law that can only be proven
in the unusual circumstances of universality and redundancy.
Despite hyperbolic assertions to the contrary, 93 lower courts had
routinely dismissed ATS cases that did not satisfy this high burden of
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 883-84.
Id. at 882-83.
Id. at 879 n.4.
Id. at 884.
28 U.S.C. § 1350.

93.

See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER

& NICHOLAS K.

MITROKOSTAS, THE AWAKENING

MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 1, 37-42, 45-48 (2003) (suggesting that the Alien
Tort Statute will create a "nightmare" that will cripple international trade and foreign direct
investment). The courts of the United States have had considerably less difficulty than some
academics think they should have had in giving content to custom. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith
& Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1148-51,
1167 (1999) (outlining common logical fallacies made by courts and commentators when inducing
customary international law); J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40
VA. J.INT'L L. 449, 469-79 (2000) (describing and criticizing the process of judicially recognizing
customary international norms),
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proof even before the decision in Alvarez-Machai II. In Flores v.
Southern Peru Copper Corp., for example, the Second Circuit ruled
that environmental torts are not in violation of customary
international law. 94 In Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit
determined that garden-variety fraud is not a violation of the law of
nations, 95 and similar conclusions have been reached with respect to
transnational defamation, 96 full First Amendment freedoms, 97 and the
fairness of state lottery distribution systems. 98 Seven years after the
decision in Fildrtiga, the American Law Institute adopted the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, which laid out a then-current catalogue of customary

human rights norms. The list generated no opposition from foreign
states or from the U.S. government itself and therefore offers an
authoritative starting point for giving content to the actionable core of
the ATS. According to the Restatement, a state violates international
law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
() systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. 99
Legal and political developments since 1987, when the
RESTATEMENT was adopted, suggest additional abuses that should be
added to this modest and well-defined list of international human
rights violations, including, inter alia, certain acts of terrorism, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, human trafficking, non-refoulement
of refugees, and violations of religious freedom. It is a mistake to
assume, however, that courts have or ever had a "free hand" to make
up norms of customary law and enforce them through the ATS. To the
contrary, courts have sustained jurisdiction under Section 1350 only
for certain egregious violations of international human rights law in
10 2
0
addition to torture: disappearances; 10 war crimes;' ' genocide;
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment-including
sexual
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

343 F.3d 140, 172 (2d Cir. 2003).
51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004).
Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 281 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983).

99.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702

(1987).
100. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
101. See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic,
102. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
No. 94 Civ. 3267 (JSM), 1996 WL 164496

694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza,
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1996).
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assault; 10 3 arbitrary detention; 0 4 and crimes against humanity. 10 5
Thus, the repeated rhetoric of caution in Alvarez-Machain IIreferring for example to the enforceability of "only a very limited set of
claims"'1 6 or "the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability"' 0 7-is
a new restriction on ATS
litigation only according to those litigants and critics who had
overstated its threat.
Consistent with Paquete Habana and its progeny, courts with
ATS cases should consult the range of evidence to determine whether
a universal practice of condemnation exists, 0 8 whether the prohibitive
norm is "reasonably"'' 0 9 well-defined, and whether states behave in a
consistent pattern out of a sense of legal obligation. If any one of
those demanding criteria is not satisfied, subject matter jurisdiction
under Section 1350 should fail. As noted by one court in one highlypoliticized ATS case, "[u]niversally recognized norms of international
law provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
adjudicating suits brought under the Alien Tort Act, which obviates
any need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved
for nonjudicial discretion."' 10
At the same time, arguments for more restrictive evidentiary
standards should continue to be rejected. The Supreme Court's
analysis in Alvarez-Machain 1 forecloses, for example, the argument
103. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996).
104. See, e.g., Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
105. See, e.g., Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
106. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainI1), 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2759 (2004).
107. Id. at 2761.
108. The courts will necessarily confront the fact that international law making processes
have remained no more constant since the eighteenth century than have the substantive norms
of international law. The process of customary law formation has been accelerated for example
by the concentration of state practice in multilateral inter governmental organizations and the
proliferation of non governmental organizations. In addition, contemporary international law no
longer fits cleanly into the dyadic logic that requires a norm to be either binding or irrelevant.
As noted in Fildrtiga,there is an intermediate category in which international instruments like
resolutions and declarations of the United Nations may be deemed "authoritative" even if they
are not directly "binding." FilArtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
EGON SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 70 (1964)).
109. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). No treaty or international
agreement defined the crime of piracy when Smith was decided, so the Court necessarily
consulted "the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or... the general usage and
practice of nations; or ...judicial decisions recognising and enforcing that law." Id. at 160-61.
Applying the evidentiary standard and method later adopted in Paquete Habana and Fildrtiga,
the Smith court found a consensus that piracy was a "crime of a settled and determinate nature"
and that "whatever may be the diversity of definitions, in other respects, all writers concur in
holding that robbery of forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi [i.e., with the intention
to steal], is piracy." Id. at 161 (emphasis supplied).
110. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
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that the category of actionable claims under the ATS is limited to
violations of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law from
which no derogation is permitted.'
Within the body of customary
international law, a handful of principles is so fundamental that they
invalidate treaties to the contrary, and this subset of customary norms
is deemed jus cogens. These natural law norms are in principle
exempt from the traditional consent and practice dynamics that create
and displace custom, and the concept and content of jus cogens have
11 2
been controversial for precisely that reason.
Sosa, like some other ATS defendants prior to Alvarez-Machain
II, had attempted to graft the jus cogens test onto the ATS, and it is
predictable that litigants may again attempt to collapse the "specific,
universal, and obligatory" standard in Alvarez-Machain II into the
considerably more restrictive jus cogens standard. But none of the
courts to which this limiting principle has been offered has adopted it.
Paquete Habana itself establishes that a customary norm need not
qualify as jus cogens in order to be justiciable generally: the
government's interference with domestic coastwise fishing vessels in
time of war violated an established customary international norm, but
there was no demonstration that those actions also satisfied the
extraordinary test of jus cogens.1 1 3 The very language of the ATS,
111.
contract
justice.
Section

Originally, jus cogens was a doctrine of Roman contract law, holding that the freedom of
was necessarily limited by certain natural law principles of good morals and public
Its related meaning in contemporary international law is established by comment k in
102 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES:

Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation, and prevailing over and invalidating
international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them.
Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of
international law having the same character.
See also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
Under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1153
U.N.T.S. 331, 334, 8 I.L.M. 679, 699:
[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.
112. MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-66 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
the jus cogens debate between the legal positivists on one hand, who rely exclusively on state
consent for the making of international law, and the natural law school of international law on
the other hand, whose adherents accept the idea of a fundamental necessary law which all states
are obliged to observe, regardless of their consent).
113. According to Section 102 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW:
Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation, and prevailing over and invalidating
international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with them.
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with its reference to "the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States" shows that Congress adopted a high, but not the highest and
most controversial, jurisdictional threshold. No court that has been
offered the jus cogens gloss on the statute has adopted it, other than to
observe that a jus cogens violation may be sufficient to satisfy the
"specific, universal, and obligatory" standard, but it is not a necessary
precondition for the actionability of the norm. 114 To the contrary, the
"specific, universal, and obligatory" standard enables courts to
distinguish genuinely customary norms from merely idiosyncratic or
aspirational norms, and the first courts to articulate that test did so
precisely to guide these sometimes difficult judgments. 115
The "18th-century paradigms" endorsed by the AlvarezMachain 1 court also foreclose the argument of several recent ATS
defendants that an act must be within the universal criminal
jurisdiction of states in order to qualify as an actionable tort under the
ATS. Clearly, many of the torts recognized to be "in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States" are also criminalized
domestically (and now internationally),1 1 6 but, here too, a sufficient
condition should not be confused with a necessary condition. Of the
three paradigmatic offenses that were "probably on the minds of the
Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of
international law having the same character.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102 cmt. K. See Vienna Convention, May
23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334.
114. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Hilao I") ; see
also Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1383 (9th Cir. 1998) (ruling that arbitrary
arrest and detention were actionable under the ATS without demonstrating that the prohibition
on such conduct rose to the level of jus cogens). Similarly, in Hilao II, the court explicitly noted
that torture is "prohibited not only by a specific, universal, and obligatory norm but by one that
reaches the level of jus cogens." 103 F.3d at 794. That language would be incomprehensible if
the "specific, universal, and obligatory" criteria referred only to jus cogens. Contrary to Sosa's
argument, there was no conflict among the circuits on this point. In Flores v. Southern Peru
Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit affirmed that ATS claimants were
only required to allege a violation of customary international law. Flores involved an ATS claim
against a private corporation for environmental degradation. The court engaged in traditional
customary law analysis and made no mention of any additional requirement to plead or prove jus
cogens norms to satisfy the ATS.
115. Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that First Amendment
rights are not so universal as to be a part of the law of nations); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (requiring that a norm be universally accepted and defined
for the purposes of the ATS) (citing Jeffrey Blum & Ralph Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdictionover
International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22
HARV.INT'L. L.J. 53, 87-90 (1981)).
116. Congress has criminalized a variety of offenses against the law of nations, and U.S.
courts have exercised criminal jurisdiction over violations of international law since the founding
of the nation. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820) (piracy);
Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784) (assault on foreign consul); Henfield's
Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (breach of neutrality).
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men who drafted the ATS"11 7-violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy-only the last was typically
prosecuted wherever the perpetrator could be found and regardless of
the nationality of the victim, the place of the depredation, or the
nationality of the actor. 18 The criminalization of acts with neither a
territorial nor a national nexus is characteristic of universal criminal
jurisdiction, and the fact that the preferred paradigm included both
"universal" and "non universal" crimes perhaps explains why, among
the Justices deciding Alvarez-Machain II, only Justice Breyer
analyzed the ATS in these terms. 19 It was well understood in 1789
that civil and criminal liability could but need not arise out of the
same act. According to Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, "for... assault,
battery, wounding, and mayhem, an indictment may be brought as
well as an action; and frequently both are accordingly prosecuted; the
one at the suit of the crown for the crime against the public, the other
at the suit of the party injured, to make him a reparation in
damages."'120 The common law tort remedy was necessarily more fluid
than the criminal prosecution and was not dependent on codification:
"Wherever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also
gives a remedy by action; and therefore, wherever a new injury is
done, a new method of remedy must be pursued. ' 12 1 A fortiori, an
actionable wrong under the ATS need not lie within every nation's
universal criminal jurisdiction.
2. Inferring Private Rights of Action from Statutes
In the course of litigating Alvarez-Machain II, Sosa and the
government had argued at length that Alexander v. Sandoval12 2 and
its progeny blocked litigation under the ATS until Congress adopted a
117. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainII), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756 (2004).
118. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162 (referring to "the general practice of all nations in
punishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed [piracy] against any
persons whatsoever, with whom they are in amity").
119. 124 S. Ct.. at 2783 (Breyer, J., concurring):
[Recognition of universal jurisdiction in respect of a limited set of norms is consistent
with principles of international comity. That is, allowing every nation's courts to
adjudicate foreign conduct involving foreign parties in such cases will not significantly
threaten the practical harmony that comity principles seek to protect. That consensus
concerns criminal jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal criminal jurisdiction
itself suggests that universal tort jurisdiction would be no more threatening.
120. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *123 (emphasis supplied).
121. 3 Id. *23. Chief Justice Marshall referred to this passage in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), quoting Blackstone; he wrote, "'it is a general and indisputable rule,
that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.'"
122. 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
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separate statute creating a particular right of action. Squarely
presented with that argument, the Court cited Sandoval not as a
prophylactic barrier to ATS litigation but as a cautionary signal that
"a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of cases." 123 The Court was
clearly right to reject any interpretation of the Sandoval criteria that
would render the ATS meaningless in the absence of additional
implementation by Congress.
At the threshold, Sandoval and its progeny establish that a
statute that focuses on the individuals protected implies an intent to
confer rights on a particular class of persons. 124 In other words, "[flor
a statute to create private rights, its text must be phrased in terms of
the persons benefited." 125 By offering a civil remedy to aliens who are
victimized by tortious violations of international law, the ATS clearly
does identify a "class of persons protected" rather than a "person
In contrast to the administrative "methods of
regulated." 126
enforcement" provided by the statute in Sandoval and similar cases,
the ATS also clearly refers to a mode of enforcement-money
damages-that is quintessentially judicial. In addition, the statute
does not focus on regulating an agency or providing funds to some
recipient, a condition that may bar the inference of a private right of
action. 127 Sandoval does require "'rights creating' language," 128 and it
cannot be argued that the ATS "creates" rights, given the clarity with
which the Court announced in Alvarez-Machain 1 that the statute
But the reference to "rights-creating
was purely jurisdictional.
language" is obligatory in a Section 1983 case like Sandoval, because
the legislation refers to statutory or constitutional rights and not, as
in the ATS, to common law rights of action. To extend this one
Sandoval criterion from statutory rights to torts is a literalism that
would undermine a conceptual basis of tort law that goes back
129
centuries.

123. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainI1), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762-63 (2004).
124. 532 U.S. at 289.
125. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 274 (2002).
126. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289.
127. Id. at 289.
128. Id. at 288.
129. See, e.g., Robert J. Kacsorowski, The Common-Law Background of Nineteenth-Century
Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1199 (1990) ("One fundamental moral principle of tort was that
one who violated community standards of reasonable behavior and injured another was morally
and therefore legally bound to compensate the victim."); see also John Henry Wigmore,
Responsibilityfor Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 ASSOC. AMER. LAW SCHOOLS, SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 474-573 (1909) (arguing that tort law began under a principle
of strict liability, regardless of fault).

2270

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57:6:2241

That the ATS was, for purposes of Sandoval, essentially
"rights-incorporating," even if it was not "rights-creating," is evident
from the transitory tort doctrine, with which the framing generation
was entirely familiar. Under this doctrine, anyone who committed a
tort was under an obligation to make reparations for it wherever he or
she went. The Supreme Court traced the transitory tort doctrine to
Lord Mansfield's opinion in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,130 noting:
The courts in England have been open in cases of trespass other than trespass upon real
property, [i.e. civil torts] to foreigners as well as to subjects, and to foreigners against
foreigners when found in England, for trespasses committed within the realm and out of
13 1
the realm, or within or without the king's foreign dominions.

In these actions, "[t]he theory of the foreign suit is that,
although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in
the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, which, like other obligations,
follows the person and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found." 132 The Framers understood that transitory torts would have
fallen within each state's general jurisdiction, and the state courts
regularly exercised this power, 133 protecting each state's legitimate
interest in the resolution of disputes brought within its borders. The
framers of Section 1350 understandably endorsed the option of
bringing into federal court that subset of transitory torts that
implicated the law of nations or the provisions of U.S. treaties, which
would assure some measure of uniformity in a matter of
fundamentally national interest. 134 There was no indication
130. 1 Cowp. 161 (1774).
131. McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 249 (1843).
132. Slater v. Mex. Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); see also Dennick v. R.R. Co., 103
U.S. 11, 18 (1880) (recognizing transitory tort doctrine).
133. See, e.g., Pease v. Burt, 3 Day 485, 488 (Conn 1806) ("[A]Ill rights of a personal nature
are transitory. A right to personal property; a right to a personal action, whether founded on a
contract, or on tort.., extend to, and may be exercised, and enforced in, any other civilized
country, where the parties happen to be."); Stout v. Wood, 1 Blackf. 71, 72 (Ind. 1820) ("The
principle of transitory actions we conceive to be this: as soon as one person becomes liable in such
action to another ... that liability attaches to the person, and follows him wherever he goes.");
Watts v. Thomas, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 458, 458 (1811) (transitory torts "may be brought wherever the
defendant may be found"); Taxier v. Sweet, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 81, 84 (Pa. 1766) ("[A]Ill transitory
actions are triable anywhere.").
134. The foreign affairs preemption doctrine does not suggest that state courts would be
incompetent to apply the law of nations to transitory tort cases brought within their personal
jurisdiction by the presence of the tortfeasor. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have found
foreign affairs preemption in only two circumstances. First, preemption is appropriate in the
presence of an extensive and detailed federal statutory regime which would be compromised by
the application of state law. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)
("When Congress intends federal law to 'occupy the field,' state law in that area is preempted.
And even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the extent of
any conflict with a federal statute.") (internal citations omitted). In contrast to the Federal
Burma law at issue in Crosby, nothing in the ATS purports to "occupy the field"; indeed, the ATS
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whatsoever that these rights of recovery did not exist in the absence of
a statute "creating" them. As a consequence, the core jurisprudence
under the ATS after Fildrtigais as consistent with Sandoval as it is
135
with Paquete Habana.
3. Simultaneously Limiting and Protecting the Creation of Federal
Common Law
In the Supreme Court, Sosa objected to any interpretation of
the ATS that empowered the courts to develop federal common law by
implementing the law of nations through appropriate civil remedies,
citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. for the
proposition that "[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in the federal courts does
not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal common
law." 136 The more complete analysis of Radcliff Materials would
acknowledge that it unanimously recognized the "need and authority
in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be known as
'federal common law,' " especially in cases where a "federal rule of
decision is 'necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,' " including
"our relations with foreign nations." 137 Similarly in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Court felt "constrained to make it clear that an
issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and
function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community
must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."1 38 Sosa had
interpreted Sabbatino exclusively as a rule of deference to the political
branches, but nothing in Sabbatino suggested that the political
branches have plenary and exclusive control over the law of nations as
they do over the law of the United States. Primacy is not exclusivity,

essentially assured that there would be the option of a federal forum for aliens' tort claims in
violation of international law. In addition, nothing in the ATS is necessarily inconsistent with
state court jurisdiction over torts in violation of the law of nations, so long as the state courts
apply international law where it is relevant. Second, preemption is also appropriate in the
presence of extensive executive negotiations and agreements that would be compromised by the
application of state law. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416-17 (2003). In
Garamendi, the Supreme Court found that California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act
was preempted by the post-World War II agreements negotiated by the president and by his
contemporary efforts to facilitate the work of the International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims. Id. at 427-29. Although it is conceivable that such negotiations would derail
particular cases, there is no similar body of prior or continuing executive negotiation that would
preempt state court jurisdiction over all ATS-like claims.
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
137. Id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
138. 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).

2272

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:6:2241

and the Framers certainly never understood that the federal
judiciary's power to construe customary international law was
subordinate to the concurrent authority of the political branches. 139 In
Justice Souter's words, "[I]t would take some explaining to say now
that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any
international norm intended to protect individuals."'140 Even when
Congress is silent, the Court may apply federal -common law
"necessarily informed both by international law principles and by
articulated congressional policies.' ' 1
The Supreme Court's treatment of federal common law before
and after Radcliffe Materials confirms the propriety of AlvarezMachain II: the law of nations is an enclave where federal rules are
required not only to protect uniquely federal interests but also to carry
out Congressional intent. 142 In contrast to Miree v. DeKalb County,1 43
for example, the uniquely federal interest in the coherent treatment of
international legal issues is sufficiently compelling to displace state
law: the "rules of international law should not be left to divergent and
perhaps parochial state interpretations."' 144 Congressional intent is no

139. Indeed, in other ATS cases, the Executive Branch has endorsed the power of the courts
to apply the strict standards of customary international law and thereby to develop federal
common law. See, e.g., Memo for U.S. in Fildrtiga, supra note 86, at 606 n.4 ("Customary
international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal courts.").
Congress expressed a similar understanding in the legislative history of the Torture Victim
Protection Act, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6 n.6 (1991) ("International human rights cases
predictably raise legal issues-such as interpretations of international law-that are matters of
Federal common law and within the particular expertise of Federal courts.").
Sosa and the government as amicus curiae stressed the Constitutional power of Congress to
"define and punish offences against the law of nations," Brief of Petitioner at 8, Sosa v. AlvarezMachain (Alvarez-Machain 1), 124 S. Ct.. 2379 (2004) (No. 03-339); Brief of United States as
Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 8, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I), 124 S.
Ct.. 2379 (2004) (No. 03-339), and doubtless Congress can statutorily specify those offences or
correct judicial "errors" in that regard, but it can also take the halfway step of directing federal
courts to hear cases where such offences are alleged, as in the ATS itself. Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 26-28 (1942).
140. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain11), 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2764-65 (2004).
141. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623,
628 n.20 (1983) (citing, inter alia, the International Court's decision in Case Concerning The
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), for international
standards of corporate law).
142. Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY.L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 5455 (2004).
143. 433 U.S. 25, 30 (1977) (holding that the interests of the United States in connection
with certain federal Aviation Administration grants would not be burdened by allowing state law
to determine whether third-party beneficiaries could sue).
144. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 15 (John Jay) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961):
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less dispositive than the intrinsically federal interest in transnational
matters: citing Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama,145 many ATS courts have found the jurisdictional grant of
Section 1350 to be evidence of Congress's intent to authorize the
fashioning of a body of federal law for the enforcement of international
legal standards, 146 and nothing in Alvarez-Machain II undermines
that analysis. To the contrary, the Court carefully articulates the
First Congress's intent in adopting the ATS in 1789, especially the
reality that the statute must have had effect from the moment of its
enactment and did not suddenly spring into meaning two centuries
later with the adoption of the Torture Victim Protection Act.
The famous dictum of Justice Brandeis in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins that "[t]here is no federal general common law" 147 is
entirely too thin a reed to support the claim that the courts must
await permission from the political branches before consulting and
applying the law of nations. Nothing in Erie suggested that the
Supreme Court intended to displace more than a century of precedent
and practice that treated the law of nations as a legitimate and
salutary example of federal common law.1 48 In addition, by following

Under the national government, treaties ...as well as the laws of nations, will always
be expounded in one sense.., whereas adjudications on the same points and
questions in thirteen States ... will not always accord or be consistent .... The

wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government
cannot be too much commended.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("cases arising
upon treaties and the laws of nations ... may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction.").
The federal courts' concurrent jurisdiction with the states under the original ATS at least
maintained the option of uniform interpretations of international law. The hostility of state
courts to aliens' claims was no less a concern. See Wythe Holt, 'To Establish Justice".Politics,the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1440-53
(1989) (outlining the States' hostility to the peace treaty ending the Revolutionary War).
145. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
146. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448; (other citations omitted):
[W]e conclude that the Alien Tort Claims Act establishes a federal forum where courts
may fashion domestic common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary
international law. Congress, of course, may enact a statute that confers on the federal
courts jurisdiction over a particular class of cases while delegating to the courts the
task of fashioning remedies that give effect to the federal policies underlying the
statute.
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 182 (D. Mass. 1995) ("[Als daunting a task as it may be to
fashion a remedy from the 'amorphous body' of international law, it is hardly out of scale with
similar challenges federal courts have successfully addressed in the past.") (citing Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448).
147. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
148. Jessup, supra note 38, at 741-43. This article is cited with approval in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain (Alvarez-MachainI1), 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2764 n.18 (2004).
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the revisionist approach to customary international law, Sosa had
attempted to extend Erie from its diversity context to the ATS, which
would mean, in the absence of some supplemental legislation, that
"the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."149 But that
in turn would raise the prospect of the chaos in international relations
that the drafters of the Constitution thought they had avoided 150 and
that the modern Supreme Court has repeatedly disapproved.151
So counter historical a result on such slender authority is
easily avoided: in the ATS, Congress authorized the federal courts to
hear and decide cases involving tortious violations of the law of
nations guided by the Supreme Court's traditional criteria for proving
the content of customary international law. As is the case in many
other contexts, including 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Congress did not
supply detailed rules to govern the litigation of such cases. Thus, to
make this grant of decision making authority effective, the federal
courts in ATS cases must derive federal common law rules to govern
such issues as statutes of limitation, standing to sue, exhaustion of
remedies, third party complicity, and the like. This delegation is not
extraordinary, nor does it threaten the separation of powers.
Congress remains free at any time to disapprove of common law rules
of decision or even the entire grant of decision making authority in the
ATS.
4. Applying the Doctrines of Diffidence
Sosa and the government had argued that implying a cause of
action under the ATS would interfere with the conduct of foreign
affairs by the political branches and the executive's efforts to protect
national security. They raised the prospect that a ruling in favor of
Alvarez-Machain would empower terrorists who had been kidnapped
on order of the President to sue the President or his delegates. 152 U.S.

149. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
150. See William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins or the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originialists,"19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 235-36 (1996) (suggesting that the Alien
Tort Clause was enacted out of concern for uniform interpretation of international law and a fear
that state courts would be hostile to aliens' claims); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of
the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 707-08

(2002) (arguing that the Framers understood the need for federal jurisdiction over cases
involving international law).
151. See, e.g., American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003) (holding that
California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act interferes with the National Government's
conduct of foreign relations and is consequently preempted by federal law).
Id. at 1145-46 (Randolph, J., concurring).
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courts would be converted into a court of claims for the world as
foreign governments were sued directly by real or alleged victims of
human rights abuse. Multinational corporations would be obliged in
U.S. courts to defend their actions anywhere in the world, even if the
real parties-in-interest and all the relevant evidence were abroad.
In Alvarez-Machain II, the Supreme Court observed Sosa's
"parade of horribles" and determined that these potential difficulties
To the
did not warrant overturning Fildtrtiga and its progeny.
contrary, the Court felt lower courts should retain their ability to
dispose of particularly sensitive cases through mechanisms such as
the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, diplomatic
immunity, and forum non conveniens, among others. 153 Certainly
nothing in the ATS or its history suggests that foreign governments
allied to the United States in the war on terrorism could be sued
154
under the statute, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA") provides the exclusive means of suing foreign governments
and their agencies or instrumentalities: 1 55 unless the plaintiff could
bring a claim that fell within the explicit exceptions to immunity laid
out by Congress in the FSIA, the foreign state and its agencies and
instrumentalities could not be sued in a U.S. court. Nor could U.S.
employees or contractors be sued individually for participating in
actions authorized by the President, because the Westfall Act allows
the United States to be substituted for such defendants, 56 meaning in

152. Brief of Petitioner at 38-40, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I1), 124 S. Ct..
2379 (2004) (No. 03-339); Brief of United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 45-46,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainII), 124 S. Ct.. 2379 (2004) (No. 03-339)
153. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23,
2002) (dismissed on grounds of diplomatic immunity); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d
1116, 1185-86 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (act of state doctrine barred adjudication of environmental tort
and racial discrimination claims); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1539-40 (S.D.
Fla. 1990) (legality of military invasion of Panama to capture defendant was unreviewable
political question). The political question doctrine barred the adjudication of Hwang Geum Joo
v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64-67 (D.D.C. 2001), in which the district court dismissed a case
filed by female sex slaves or "comfort women" against the government of Japan on grounds of
foreign sovereign immunity and the political question doctrine, but the Court of Appeals, clearly
understanding the limits of the political question doctrine affirmed on the basis of foreign
sovereign immunity alone. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003), was resolved in the government's
favor under habeas principles. The ATS claim in that case was dismissed, because, according to
the Court of Appeals, ATS actions cannot be brought against federal officials. Id. at 1144-45. No
other member of the panel joined Judge Randolph's separate concurrence, in which he criticized
the ATS in dicta.
Id. at 1145-46 (Randolph, J., concurring).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2000).
155. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000).
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turn that their liability, if any, lies under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
not the ATS.
Even in principle, these doctrines of diffidence cannot be
converted into a prophylactic barrier to ATS litigation. With respect
to the political question doctrine, for example, the Supreme Court has
observed that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance," 157
noting that courts routinely distinguish between cases in which there
are no judicially manageable standards and cases in which clear
customary and conventional international legal standards provide the
rule of decision. 158 Equally important, according to the executive
branch itself, there are circumstances in which not adjudicating ATS
claims would compromise the foreign relations of the United States:
[B]efore entertaining a suit alleging a violation of human rights, a court must first
conclude that there is a consensus in the international community that the right is
protected and that there is a widely shared understanding of the scope of this protection.
When these conditions have been satisfied, there is little danger that judicial
enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to
recognize a private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the
159
credibility of our nation's commitment to the protection of human rights.

ATS actions case-by-case can serve the long-term political
interests of the nation, because not adjudicating human rights cases,
and thereby offering abusers a form of safe haven, can dramatically
compromise U.S. foreign relations, as Iranian revolutionaries
demonstrated in 1979 by seizing the U.S. embassy and scores of
hostages when the former Shah of Iran entered the United States
under apparent U.S. protection.
The act of state doctrine, under which U.S. courts will decline
to determine the legality of a foreign government's official acts taken
within its own territory, can bar particular ATS cases, if the plaintiffs
injury was directly caused by a foreign government's law or official

157. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
158. See, e.g., Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 932, 934
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that the political question doctrine, with its "shifting contours and
uncertain underpinnings" and its "susceptib[ility] to indiscriminate and overbroad application,"
cannot displace whatever legal standards apply "particularly to the extent that appellants seek
to vindicate personal rights rather than to conform America's foreign policy to international legal
norms.").
159. Memo for U.S. in Fildrtiga,supra note 86, at 604. Emmerich de Vattel, the leading
eighteenth-century publicist on the law of nations, United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm., 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978), underscored that providing a private remedy for
foreigners injured by violations of international or domestic law was an essential means of
reducing friction between nations. 2 EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, ch. 6, §§ 71, 78
(Joseph Chitty ed., 1852).
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policy.16° However, the act of state doctrine can pose no per se barrier
to the inference of a cause of action from international human rights
law. The courts have limited the doctrine to shield only official acts,
by a government in power, in pursuit of a public purpose, 161 and the
fact that foreign governments are unlikely to claim human rights
abuse as official policy suggests that the doctrine need not derail ATS
cases in the Fildrtigamodel. Nor is the doctrine applicable when the
court can apply international law norms adopted by a clear consensus
among states, because "the courts can then focus on the application of
an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
1 62
national interest or with international justice."
Similarly, the forum non conveniens doctrine is too factdependent to erect a prophylactic bar to ATS actions. The plaintiffs
choice of forum is generally entitled to respect, but forum non
conveniens permits the court in narrow circumstances to dismiss the
claim even if jurisdiction over the claim is proper. The forum non
conveniens inquiry proceeds in two stages: first the court must
consider whether an adequate alternative forum exists,1 63 and, if so,
the court must balance a series of factors involving the private
interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in the competing

160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 443,
444. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the Supreme Court declined to adopt any
"inflexible and all-encompassing rule," noting that deference is appropriate only when judicial
resolution of the case "may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for
itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere." 376 U.S. 398,
423, 428 (1964).
161. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406-10 (1990)
(holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply where the validity of a foreign sovereign act
was not at issue); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-705
(1976) ("It is the position of the United States... that repudiations by a foreign sovereign of its
commercial debts should not be considered to be acts of state beyond legal question in our
courts."); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) (holding that the act of state doctrine did not apply where
there was no evidence that the defendants' acts were acts of state); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1545-46 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (refusing to apply the act of state doctrine where it was
unclear whether "adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims will necessarily entail considering the
legality of official acts of a foreign state").
162. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 cmt. c ("A claim arising out of an alleged violation of
fundamental human rights ...would ...probably not be defeated by the act of state doctrine,
since the accepted international law of human rights is well established ....
").
163. A forum non conveniens motion "may not be granted unless an adequate alternative
forum exists," and, in general, "[ain alternative forum is ordinarily adequate if the defendants
are amenable to service of process there and the forum permits litigation of the subject matter of
the dispute." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981).
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forum, and any public interests at stake. 164 Both steps engage the
court in an intensely ad hoc assessment of the facts in each case. In
an ATS human rights case, for example, it may be difficult for the
defendant to prove that an adequate alternative forum exists in the
state where the abuse occurred, but that showing can and has been
made in some cases. 165 The balance of public and private factors is
similarly left to the sound discretion of the court and determined ad
hoc.166 Equally important (and quite apart from the fact-dependency
of the doctrine), forum non conveniens cannot justify a blanket refusal
to infer a cause of action from international human rights law: first
because the burden rests on the defendant to prove that the factors tilt
"strongly" in favor of trial in a foreign forum, and, second, because the
ATS, as supplemented by the Torture Victim Prevention Act, reflects

164. Under Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947), private interests include "the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive."
Public interest considerations include administrative difficulties associated with court
congestion; the unfairness of imposing jury duty on a community with no relation to the
litigation; the interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and avoiding difficult
problems in conflict of laws and the application of foreign law. Id. at 508-09.
165. "If the plaintiff shows that conditions in the foreign forum plainly demonstrate that
'plaintiffs are highly unlikely to obtain basic justice therein,' " a defendant's forum non
conveniens motion must be denied. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc, No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL
31082956, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (citation omitted), reversed and remanded, 77 Fed.
Appx. 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2003). Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (corruption in Bolivian justice system precluded dismissal of action on forum non
conveniens grounds), with Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (courts of Ecuador
provided adequate alternative forum for citizens' claims, and balance of private and public
interest factors weighed strongly in favor of trial in Ecuadorian courts, warranting conditional
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds).
166. Compare Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 541-44 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (both private and public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of dismissal under forum
non conveniens of Peru residents' ATS action against American company alleging pollutioncaused health problems from company's mining operations in Peru), with Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 101-08 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing and remanding district court's
conditional forum non conveniens dismissal of ATS action against Dutch company for complicity
in human rights abuses in Nigeria).
As noted by one district court in the immediate aftermath of Alvarez-Machain II, "[Tihe
Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.. 2739 (2004), does not
undermine [this court's prior] determination that the burden on the defendant is substantially
outweighed by the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief, and that the United States has a strong
interest in vindicating violations of established human rights. New York also has an interest in
ensuring that companies doing business in the state adhere to recognized norms of international
law." Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9882(DLC), 2004 WL
1920978, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (citation omitted).
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a powerful U.S. policy interest in providing a forum for the
16 7
adjudication of international human rights abuses.
In Alvarez-Machain II, the Court refused either to exaggerate
the threat of Fildrtiga-likeactions or to undervalue the discretionary
doctrines available to derail the most troubling cases. In doing so, the
Court declined Sosa's invitation to transform case-specific concerns
into a rationale for nullifying the ATS altogether. Ultimately, we may
wonder how a handful of human rights cases can complicate the life of
the State Department in ways that are intolerable, when the Supreme
Court's decisions in such cases as Alvarez-Machain 1,168
1 71 provoked
Aerospatiale,169 Hartford Insurance,170 or even Sabbatino
considerably more political and diplomatic controversy than any of the
human rights cases that had the ATS critics so exercised.
Lower courts with ATS cases are obliged to be "vigilant
doorkeep[ers]," according to Justice Souter in Alvarez-Machain II, but
as this Part has shown, the standards for vigilance have been the law
of the United States for decades, if not centuries.
III. RETROGRADE INNOVATION IN APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL NORM
AGAINST ARBITRARY DETENTION

Not all of the analysis in Alvarez-Machain I fits into the
mainstream of American jurisprudence. In holding that AlvarezMachain's claims for arbitrary arrest did not satisfy its evidentiary
rule, the Supreme Court at best introduced uncertainty where none
existed before. The physical security of persons against arrest and
imprisonment without due process of law has long been considered a
basic human right and a fundamental principle of liberal democracy,
codified in every comprehensive universal and regional human rights

167. See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 100.
168. United States v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain II), 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992)
(holding that a criminal defendant brought to the United States via abduction "may be tried in
federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United States.").
169. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 538-40
(1987) (stating that the Hague Convention did not deprive the court of "the jurisdiction it
otherwise possessed to order a foreign national party before it to produce evidence physically
located within a signatory nation.").
170. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769-770 (1993) (holding that "the
principle of international comity does not preclude District Court jurisdiction over foreign
conduct").
171. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-39 (1963) (holding that the act
of state doctrine precludes U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of decrees by the Cuban
government expropriating American property).
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instrument 172 and affirmed in national constitutions around the
world. 173 Indeed, the prohibition against the arbitrary arrest and
detention of persons is a cornerstone of international human and civil
rights law, rooted in an Anglo-American tradition that dates back to
174
the Magna Carta and is likewise embodied in the Bill of Rights.
Human rights organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and
national leaders, including those in the United States, routinely
condemn authoritarian states, such as Cuba, Iran, and Burma
17 5
(Myanmar) for arbitrarily arresting and detaining persons.
Domestic courts that have addressed this issue have repeatedly held
1 76
that the arbitrary arrests and detention violate international law.
172. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) ("No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile.")
[hereinafter UDHR]; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175
[hereinafter ICCPR]; the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 226, E.T.S. No. 5 (1950) [hereinafter European
Convention]; the American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 re. 6 (1979), Art. 7(3) [hereinafter American Convention]; the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, Art. 6.
173. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 260-61 (1993) (The prohibition against arbitrary arrest is found in
"at least 119 national constitutions"). The U.S. Department of State recognizes 192 independent
countries in the world. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH FACT
SHEET (2003).
174. Bassiouni, supra note 173, at 254. Over 119 states, including the United States and all
the major constitutional democracies, provide against arbitrary arrest or detention in their own
constitutions. Id. at 261 & n.117.
175. See, e.g., United States-Cuba Economic Relations: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Finance, 108th Cong. 49-50 (2003) (prepared statement of Alan Larson, Undersecretary, United
States Department of State) ("The Cuban Government has responded to the Cuban people's
democratic aspirations with a troubling further crackdown on fundamental freedoms ....
the
Cuban government routinely engages in arbitrary arrests and detentions of human rights
advocates"); Gilbert Laurin (Canada), UN Addressing Third Committee, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 11,
2003:
[I1n Iran, little progress had been made, especially in terms of freedom of expression,
arbitrary detention and torture, and that the State Peace and Development Council
continued to deny to the people of Burma the exercise of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms.... Canada was deeply disturbed that the physical integrity of
the person remained under severe attack, with the deplorable use of torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, and extrajudicial killings in places such as Nigeria.
176. See, e.g., Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[T]here
is a clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention."); Siderman de Blake
v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992) (identifying jus cogens norm against prolonged
arbitrary detention); Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicar., 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir.
1985) (stating that arbitrary detention violates the law of nations); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 184-85 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that torture, summary execution, disappearance, and
arbitrary detention violate international law); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D. Fla.
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Taken together, this is evidence of an international consensus
supporting the norm against arbitrary arrest and detention that is no
less compelling than the norm against torture recognized by the
Fildrtigacourt.
It would be incongruous to interpret Alvarez-Machain II as
though it undermined the normative status of the right to be free of
arbitrary arrest and detention; indeed, when the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Alvarez-Machain II, it had already
determined that detainees in the war on terrorism had a fundamental
right to challenge the legality of their detention and that the detention
camp at Guantanamo Bay was not a "law-free zone. ' 177 Rather, the
Court carefully limited its holding to the narrow facts of this case: "a
single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by a transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no
norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the
creation of a federal remedy." 178 At no point did the Court declare that
the arrest and detention of Alvarez-Machain had been lawful, only
that he had failed to prove that his treatment violated an
international norm as "specific, universal, and obligatory" as the
"18th-century paradigms we have recognized."' 1 79 The distinction is
crucial, because it preempts the a fortiori argument in future cases
that virtually no human rights norms are actionable under the ATS if
the norm against arbitrary arrest and detention is not.
Narrow as the Court's holding was, it was erroneous in two
essential respects.
First, as alluded to earlier, it rested on a
misleading recharacterization of Alvarez-Machain's argument. The
Supreme Court claimed that respondent "invoke[d] a general
prohibition on 'arbitrary' detention defined as officially sanctioned
action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic
law some government, regardless of the circumstances."18 0 AlvarezMachain's actual claim-that his abduction and transportation to the
United States violated U.S., Mexican, and international law-was
considerably more specific:' it alleged that the abduction fell outside

1994) (upholding damage award for injuries caused by arbitrary detention); Forti v. Suarez
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("There is case law finding sufficient consensus
to evince a customary international human rights norm against arbitrary detention.").
177. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2699 (2004) (holding that aliens detained at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base had the right to challenge the legality of their detentions in federal
court); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649-50 (2004) (holding that a citizen detainee had
the right to challenge his "enemy combatant" status in federal court).
178. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machainfl), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004).
179. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
180. Id. at 2768.
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the DEA's statutory arrest authority18' and violated the Mansfield
Amendment's
explicit prohibition on DEA participation in
extraterritorial arrests.18 2 In addition, Alvarez-Machain argued that
no country may lawfully exercise police powers in the territory of
another without the latter's consent.18 3 The Court of Appeals had
ruled en banc that the norm prohibiting such abductions was not
18 4
actionable under the ATS and that, contrary to the panel decision,
there was no international customary norm barring transborder
abductions. 8 5 The failure of the Supreme Court to revisit those
conclusions of the en banc court, combined with its own dismissal of
the arbitrary arrest and detention claim, mean that the norms of both
territorial integrity 8 6 and individual human rights have been
compromised, at least in the context of this one extraordinary case.

181. The DEA authorization statute, 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2004), provides that
[a]ny officer or employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration ...

may ...

(3)

make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the United States
committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony, cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing a felony ....
Nothing in the statute authorizes extraterritorial arrests.
Both the Foley Brothers
presumption against the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949) (denying application of a work-day law to work performed outside of the country), and the
Charming Betsy principle requiring statutes to be construed in conformity with international
law, Murray v. The Schooner CharmingBetsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (awarding restitution
for a ship and cargo confiscated while in violation of a trade embargo with France), cut against
any interpretation of Section 878 that would allow non consensual extraterritorial arrests.
182. The Mansfield Amendment, 32 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (2004), expressly prohibits federal
employees from "directly effect[ing] an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police
action with respect to narcotics control efforts." The absence of authority is reinforced by the
legislative history of the amendment. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report stated
that "[iut is the Committee's intent that 'police action,' as used in this provision is meant to
prohibit U.S. narcotics agents abroad from engaging in actions involving the use of force and
actions involving the arrest of foreign nationals-whether unilaterally ... or as members of
teams involving agents or officials of other foreign governments." Internal Security Assistance &
Arms Control Act, S. 2662, 94th Cong. § 55 (1976).
183. As emphasized by Justice Story in The Apollon, a case involving a U.S. seizure of a
foreign vessel in a Spanish port: "It would be monstrous to suppose that our revenue officers
were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels
which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily
justify such a clear violation of the law of nations." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-71 (1824). The
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2) is no

less categorical: "A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory
of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that
state."
184. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001).
185. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
186. As noted by Professor Henkin, 'When done without consent of the foreign government,
abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross
disrespect for a norm high in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation of the territorial
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The second essential error of the Court was its unexplained
dicta dismissing claims based on the Universal Declaration of Human
18 7
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Court returned to a conception of the Declaration that is
anachronistic by several decades, inconsistent with the Court's
precedent,18 8 and contrary to the favorable invocation of Fildrtiga,
which had considered the Declaration authoritative if non-binding
evidence of a widely accepted norm. Similarly, the decision to ignore
the provisions of the ICCPR because it is understood to be non-selfexecuting is a careless expansion of a dubious doctrine that the
Supreme Court has long limited and which has not prevented lower
courts with ATS cases from giving that treaty evidentiary weight in
determining the content of custom. 8 9 Nothing in Alvarez-Machain II
suggests that those prior decisions were wrong; indeed, the Court cites
some of them with approval. 190
It is one thing to deprive Alvarez-Machain of an individual
remedy under the ATS because the facts-a state-sponsored
extraterritorial seizure by independent contractors based on a grand
jury indictment and federal arrest warrant, which took less than
twenty-four hours and did not result in any physical injury-did not
establish a significant violation of the norm against arbitrary arrest
and detention. It is considerably more injudicious to suggest without
explanation that the norm is questionable because of its inclusion in
the Declaration and the ICCPR.
lV. THE NEXT FRONTIER IN ALIEN TORT LITIGATION
The first significant battle over the interpretation of AlvarezMachain 1 will come in a variety of cases testing whether corporate
actors may be liable under the ATS for their complicity in human
rights abuses by the government with which they do business. 91
integrity of another state ....
" Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 231 (1992).

187. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain II), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004).
188. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 n.13 (1965) (quoting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in the interpretation of the requirements of due process); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16 (1963) (citing the Universal Declaration as evidence of norm
against statelessness); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 n.14 (1970) (citing UDHR
Article 25 as informative "on the issue of whether there is a 'right' to welfare assistance").
189. See, e.g.,Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1996); Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d
Cir. 1980).
190. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. 2766.
191. See, e.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370
(D.N.J. 2001) (dismissing claim against a German company and its two American subsidiaries

2284

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57:6:2241

Many such cases have been dismissed on jurisdictional, political, or
factual grounds, and others have been derailed under the forum non
conveniens doctrine. 92 Especially in the context of cases arising out of
World War II against Japanese and German government entities or
corporations, the treaties ending the war have been interpreted to
render additional compensation or reparations a matter for the
executive branch.' 93 If anything, the corporate cases that have
actually been decided reaffirm that the courts have the necessary tools
to distinguish non justiciable or frivolous claims from those that are
meritorious.
No part of Alvarez-Machain 1 turned on the circumstances
under which a corporation faces liability for a breach of international
law, but the government and a coalition of business interests had
urged the Court to interpret the ATS so as to bar such actions. 194 The
Court implicitly rejected the propositions that corporations are in
principle immune from liability under international law or that the
prospect of abusive lawsuits required a narrow interpretation of the
ATS. Instead, the Court reasoned only that "the determination
whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action" is
"related [to] whether international law extends the scope of liability
for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
195
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."'
For these purposes, the Court contrasted torture, which does require

for Holocaust reparations); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 244 F. Supp. 2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suit against an oil company for allegedly collaborating with the government
to commit genocide); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2002) (suit against pharmaceutical company for administering dangerous, experimental
medicine without informed consent); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.J.
2000) (suit against several banks for their complicity in accepting deposits of assets that had
been converted from French Holocaust victims); Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp.. 880 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (Unocal 1), 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Unocal I1), on appeal, Nos. 00-56603, 0057197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL 31063976 (9th Cir. 2002) (suit against an oil company for
allegedly committing "atrocities" on nearby farmers). As of this writing, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals has reheard the case en banc and directed the parties to brief the effect of AlvarezMachain II. Doe v. Unocal, reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 00-56603, 00-56628, 2003
WL 359787 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003). The prospect of civil liability is one part of a larger
corporate responsibility movement, and much of what follows draws on the analysis in Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Corporate Responsibility and the InternationalLaw of Human Rights: The New Lex
Mercatoria,in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005).
192. E.g., In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
193. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Cf. Joo v. Japan, 332
F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004).
194. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the National Foreign Trade Council et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez.MachainI1), 124 S. Ct.. 2379 (2004) (No. 03-339).
195. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain I1), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.20 (2004).
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state action in order to be a violation of international law, 196 with
genocide, which does not. 197 The Court also noted a particular set of
pending class actions "seeking damages from various corporations
alleged to have participated in, or abetted, the regime of apartheid
that formerly controlled South Africa," but rather than decide that all
such cases were beyond the reach of the ATS, the Court declared
instead that "[iln such cases, there is a strong argument that federal
courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of
198
the case's impact on foreign policy."
For centuries, the imposition of individual liability for certain
international wrongs (e.g., piracy) has generated little controversy.
Certainly the framers of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 had little
doubt that private citizens who infringed the rights of ambassadors or
diplomats could be sued under Section 1350.199 Pirates, the exemplar
of intended defendants under the ATS, were not always or necessarily
considered state actors, but there was never any question that their
actions violated international law; indeed, one of the earliest exercises
of jurisdiction under the ATS involved an unlawful seizure of property
by a non state actor. 20 0 The statute subsequently provided jurisdiction
over a child custody dispute that involved a breach of the law of

196. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Mtng. No. 93, at pt. I, Art. I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46
(1984).
197. Article IV of the Genocide Convention for example requires that persons committing
genocide be punished, "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or
private individuals. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
198. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct.. at 2766 n.21. Consistent with prior decisions, the
Court's formulation of the deference standard in Alvarez-Machain II both protects and limits the
power of executive suggestion. In applying the act of state doctrine, for example, a majority of
the Supreme Court would give considerable but not conclusive weight to the views of the
executive branch. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767-70 (1972).
In matters of treaty interpretation, by contrast, the executive's submissions are entitled to "great
weight." Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982). But the
courts cannot in the name of the separation of powers surrender their authority to determine
what the law is. In The Paqueta Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1900), the result-reversing a
decree of condemnation in prize-compromised in principle the executive's conduct of maritime
war. In that case, the executive had stated its willingness to be bound by the law of nations, but
its interpretation of these obligations, based on its stance in the war and in the litigation, was
plainly not the same as the Court's and was not considered persuasive, let alone determinative.
Our "cultural commitment to judicial oversight," Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1307 (1976), places a heavy burden of justification on
those who would carve out any per se categories of judicial incompetence in protecting
individuals' rights.
199. Alvarez-Machain II, 124 S. Ct. at 2757.
200. Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (stating that ATS jurisdiction exists for
French citizens' restitution claim for seized slaves).
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nations. 20 1 In settings other than Alvarez-Machain II, the executive
branch has concluded that corporations are in principle capable of
violating the law of nations or a treaty of the United States for
purposes of the ATS, 202 and that conclusion is consistent with wellestablished international norms to which the United States has given
its assent. Specific treaties establish that private actors may be
punished for acts of genocide, slavery, and war crimes. 20 3 These
regimes do not distinguish between natural and juridical individuals,
and corporations that engage in the slave trade or commit acts of
genocide or provide corporate cover for war crimes would not as a
matter of law be exempt from liability. "Certain forms of conduct
violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under
the auspices of a state or only as private individuals." 204
This suggests that there are at least two distinct circumstances
in which a corporation (or any other private actor) might bear

201. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-63 (D. Md. 1961).
202. See, e.g., 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, *4-*5 (1907) (concluding that aliens injured by a private
company's diversion of water in violation of a bilateral treaty between Mexico and the United
States could sue under the ATS); see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1975) (concluding that liability
for violations of international law under the ATS would extend to those "committing, aiding, or
abetting" the tort).
203. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, Art. IV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280; common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions similarly
binds non state actors when they are parties to an international armed conflict; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Feb. 2,
1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Feb. 2,
1956, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Feb. 2. 1956, 6 U.T.S. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Feb. 2. 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
204. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995); accord Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d
493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that official acts of torture violate international law). In
Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals
assumed without deciding that the ATS confers jurisdiction over private parties who conspire in,
or aid an abet, official acts of torture. After World War II, the Nuremberg tribunal found a
number of German nationals guilty of internationally criminal activity that took corporate form.
See, e.g., United States v. Alfried Felix Alwyn Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach ("The Krupp
Case"), in 9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1327 (1950-52); United States v. Carl Krauch ('The Farben
Case"), in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1179 (1950-52); United States v. Friedrich Flick ('The Flick
Case"), in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 1187 (1950-52). In collecting and assessing this and related

international authority, the court in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp.. 2d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), concluded that "a considerable body of United States and
international precedent indicates that corporations may be liable for violations of international
law." Nothing in Alvarez-Machain II qualifies, contradicts, or undermines this conclusion.
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international responsibility: (1) a category of per se wrongs, in which
the corporation-like any individual-commits one of that narrow
class of wrongs identified by treaty or custom as not requiring state
action to be considered wrongful; and (2) a category of contextual
wrongs, in which the corporation's conduct is sufficiently infused with
state action as to engage international standards. To date, no
corporation has been found liable under the ATS under either theory,
but both remain viable in the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain II, despite
the strong position staked out by business groups as amici curiae.
In attempting to articulate a sound basis for the second
category of wrongs, many U.S. courts have turned to the "color of law"
jurisprudence adopted by U.S. courts under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.205
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that these
decisions "have not been a model of consistency." 20 6 In one case, the
Court premised Section 1983 liability only on a nexus "sufficiently
close" that the state's exercise of "coercive power" or its "significant
encouragement, either overt or covert," necessitates that the private
actor's conduct "must in law be deemed to be that of the state."20 7 In
another case, the Court concluded that a private actor acts under color
of law if "he has acted with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State."20 8 In other cases, courts have considered whether there is "a
substantial degree of cooperative action" between the state and the

205. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002
WL 319887, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002)(citations omitted):
"A private individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when
he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid." The relevant test...
is the "joint action" test, under which private actors are considered state actors if they
are "willful participant[s] in joint action with the state or its agents." "Where there is
a substantial degree of cooperative action between the state and private actors in
effectuating the deprivation of rights, state action is present."
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996) ("The 'color
of law' jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has
engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act."). Accord Hilao v.
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1476, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
206. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Leebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)).
207. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
208. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S: 715, 725 (1961) ("[T]he State has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private party] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."); accord NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488
U.S. 179, 192 (1988) (citations omitted):
[T]he question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive
conduct as state action. This may occur if the State creates the legal framework
governing the conduct; if it delegates its authority to the private actor; or sometimes if
it knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior.
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private actor in effecting the deprivation of rights, 20 9 or whether the
210
state and private actors "share a common, unconstitutional goal."
Some courts have concluded that a close financial relationship
between the private party and the state is sufficient to satisfy the
"color of law" requirement. 2 11 Some require instead a "symbiotic
212
relationship," a "close nexus," or a "conspiracy" between them.
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to summarize the
law, it declared that "[t]he Supreme Court has articulated four
distinct approaches to the state action question: public function, state
compulsion, nexus, and joint action."2 13 Problems in applying each of
these tests remain.
For purposes of the ATS, the lowest common denominator
among these various approaches is that vicarious or strict liability is
not the proper standard, meaning that a corporation's mere presence
in a country where human rights abuse occurred is no more plausible
as a ground of liability than is its mere presence in an American city
where the police beat citizens on account of their race. The law of
proximate cause remains intact under the ATS, and, where it can be
demonstrated inter alia that a company entered into business
agreements with a government, intending and understanding either
actually or constructively that human rights would be violated for
profit, the burden of persuasion rests on those who would carve out an
exception to the ATS for corporate conduct. There is certainly no rule
that corporations, regardless of their relationship with a government,
enjoy immunity for their state-like or state-related activities, as when
they interrogate detainees, provide public security, work weapons
systems in armed conflict, or run prisons.
In developing the federal common law to govern the corporate
cases, courts are required under Alvarez-Machain 1 to determine
"whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued."2 14 With respect to the
209. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
210. Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (9th Cir.
1991); accord Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 437 (9th cir. 1983) ("A private party may be
considered to have acted under color of state law when it engages in a conspiracy or acts in
concert with state agents to deprive one's constitutional rights.").
211. Jatoi v. Hurst-Eutess-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1221-22, modified on denial
of reh'g, 819 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988).
212. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (stating that private actor, in
attaching property through self-help, was a state actor).
213. George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus for
example, "[u]nder the joint action approach, private actors can be state actors if they are wilful
participant[s] in joint action with the state or its agents. An agreement between government and
a private party can create joint action." Id. at 1231 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
214. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-Machain//),124S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.20 (2004).
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per se category of wrongs, international law clearly does extend
With
liability to corporations for certain extraordinary wrongs.
respect to the contextual wrongs, courts should follow the evidentiary
discipline of Fildrtigaand its progeny, by considering the statutes and
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals, 215 the full range of
the practice of states in adopting "human rights conditionality" in
their domestic law, international regulatory standards for
corporations, the transnational lex mercatoria that corporations have
adopted for themselves, 2 16 and "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations." 217 This would include command responsibility,
aiding-and-abetting liability for torts or civil law delicts, 2 18 and
Section 1983-like nexus standards in the various nations. At the same

215. Article 7 of the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and Article 6 of the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
impose individual criminal responsibility upon persons who have "planned, instigated, ordered,
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of the
crimes specified in the statute. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Art. 7, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993), amended by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd
Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. SJRES/1166 (1998); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, Art. 6, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994). The decisions of these tribunals may also suggest the contours of indirect civil liability
under the ATS. As noted by the court in PresbyterianChurch of Sudan v.Talisman Energy, Inc.,
244 F. Supp.. 2d 289, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003): "With regard to the level of aid, international law, as
reflected in the judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
appears to have settled on a requirement that assistance be 'direct and substantial.' " See, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Furundzjia, IT-95-17/1-PT (Dec. 10, 1998), at 249, 252:
[T]he Trial Chamber holds the legal ingredients of aiding and abetting in
international criminal law to be the following: the actus reus consists of practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime. The mens rea required is the knowledge that these acts
assist the commission of the offence. If [an individual] gives some sort of assistance
and support with the knowledge.., that torture is being practised, then the
individual may be found guilty of aiding and abetting in the perpetration of torture.
216. See Steinhardt, supranote 191.
217. These "general principles" are one source of international law under the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. I.C.J. STAT., art. 38. One potential source of constructive
redundancy is the continental notion of Drittwirkung,under which private parties may be found
to have violated certain constitutional rights of citizens, even if the constitution primarily limits
the conduct of the state and its actors. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
PRIVATE SPHERE 179-82 (1993); Case of X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1985).

218. Several courts have determined that aiding-and-abetting liability is established in
international law and is therefore available under the ATS. PresbyterianChurch of Sudan, 244
F. Supp. 2d at 320-24; Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Mehinovic
v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355-56 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d. 767, 776 (9th Cir.
1996) (approving jury instruction allowing former head of foreign state to be held liable under
the ATS upon finding that he "directed, ordered, conspired with or aided the military" in
committing abuses).
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time, the courts must be careful not to erect an evidentiary test that
international law cannot satisfy. As noted by the Supreme Court,
"[o]ffen[s]es ...against the law of nations, cannot with any accuracy,
be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any public code
recogni[z]ed by the common consent of nations." 219 The proper
question is whether a "specific, universal, and obligatory" norm exists,
not whether the details of its domestic enforcement are the same
around the world and in international institutions:
While it is demonstrably possible for nations to reach some consensus on a binding set of
principles, it is both unnecessary and implausible to suppose that, with their
multiplicity of legal systems, these diverse nations should also be expected or required
to reach consensus on the types of actions that should be made available in their
220
respective courts to implement those principles.

Under Alvarez-Machain II, the courts must be vigilant that a
particular international norm exists before implying a cause of action
to enforce it under the ATS, but it must avoid requiring an
"unnecessary and implausible" 221 consensus on the details of domestic
enforcement.
V. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL
In Alvarez-Machain II, the Supreme Court announced that it
would "welcome any congressional guidance in exercising jurisdiction
with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations. '222 The lower
courts repeatedly have found significance in the fact that Congress
had a clear opportunity to revise or restrict the ATS and did the
opposite in the Torture Victim Protection Act. 22 3 It is also significant
that the Bush Administration's hostility to the ATS has yet to lead it
to introduce legislation repealing or modifying the statute. But
legislation could serve the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants,
as well as the judiciary, by codifying both the rule of evidence at the
heart of Alvarez-Machain 1 and the reasonable limitations courts
have placed on claims and defenses.
Attached as an annex to this Article is a proposed statute, "The
Human Rights Abuse Compensation and Deterrence Act," which
219. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820).
220. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 180 (D.Mass. 1995).
221. Id.
222. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez-MachainI1), 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004).
223. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 941 (2001); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic,
70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp.. 2d 1345, 1365
(S.D. Fla. 2001); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 993 F. Supp.. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).

2004]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

2291

draws on existing statutes and the coherent jurisprudence under the
ATS to define the actionable core of future human rights cases.
Adapting both the Torture Victim Protection Act, supra, and the AntiTerrorism Act, 224 inter alia, the statute would establish jurisdiction,
venue, and a cause of action for such wrongs as genocide, slavery or
slave trade, extrajudicial killing, causing the disappearance of any
person, torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, arbitrary
detention, or other gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights, each of which is carefully defined in Section 6 in light of
prevailing international standards and practices. It may be necessary
to adapt an "escalator" clause t% accommodate human rights as they
evolve in the future, much as the right to be free of torture or racial
225
discrimination evolved in the post-war world.
Section 3 of the statute establishes the scope of liability for
individuals, both natural and juridical, who commit any of these
wrongs. In addition to imposing liability for intentionally committing
the defined abuses, the statute would impose liability for ordering,
soliciting, or inducing the commission of the wrong, and it adopts the
dominant standard for aiding and abetting liability, 226 namely that the
defendant "materially assists in the commission of [the] tort with the
knowledge that such assistance will directly and substantially
contribute to the commission of the tort." This restriction protects
corporations that may coexist or cooperate with abusive regimes but
that are not factually connected to those regimes' repressive
conduct. 227 Section 3 also codifies the international consensus on
command responsibility.
Section 4 specifies three limitations on human rights actions:
an exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement, a ten-year statute of
limitations, and a codified version of the forum non conveniens
doctrine.
Consistent with existing doctrine and the TVPA, the
plaintiff need only exhaust remedies that are "adequate and
available," meaning that the requirement can be waived by the court
if, for example, the foreign courts do not or cannot guarantee due
process for the claimant, or if seeking relief in the foreign country
224. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333-35 (2004).
225. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
226. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing common law
theories of aiding and abetting and conspiracy); Burnett v. Al Baraka 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 104
(D.D.C. 2003) (allowing a suit against financiers of Al Qaeda to proceed under the ATS, TVPA,
and ATA as well as common law claims based on the allegation that "al Qaeda committed a
wrongful act that caused injury to the plaintiffs and that [defendants] knowingly financed al
Qaeda in the furtherance of international terrorism").
227. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 502-04 (2001).
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would be dangerous to the claimant. 228 The statute of limitations is
also modeled on the TVPA, is similarly subject to the traditional
tolling doctrines, and reflects the recognized principle of international
law that there can be no statute of limitations for certain egregious
violations of human rights. 229 The forum non conveniens provision
synthesizes the doctrine as applied to date in ATS cases, including the
rebuttable presumption that the plaintiffs choice of forum will be
230
respected except in compelling circumstances.
The proposed legislation has the virtue and the vice of
compromise: defendants get notice of the abusive behavior that is
actionable, and the scope of their liability is defined and thus limited.
In addition, certain recurring defenses explicitly limit the actionability
of the underlying norms. Plaintiffs, oil the other hand, get a clarity
that will be useful in fending off abusive or repetitive pretrial motions
and the assurance that corporations that engage in abusive behavior
in either the per se category or the contextual category may be found
liable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dean Harold Koh has provocatively considered Fildrtiga the
human rights movement's Brown v. Board of Education,23 1 and both
decisions do illustrate the power and the limits of achieving social
change through civil litigation. Both cases reflected and accentuated a
rights consciousness.
Both seemed revolutionary; yet both were
entirely
consistent
with traditional
doctrines of American
jurisprudence. If Brown was the antidote to the Marxist view of law,
Fildrtiga was the antidote to the "pure sovereignty" view of
international law. Both Brown and Fildrtiga rested in part on the
support of the executive branch, but, in Alvarez-Machain II, the Bush
Administration asked the Court to eviscerate the ATS, the irony being
lost on no one that a conservative Department of Justice would
228. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1),
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug.
10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, 36.
229. See e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 6, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970);
European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82 (not yet entered into force). See
also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 29, U.N. Doc.
32/A/Conf. 183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 ("The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall
not be subject to any statute of limitations.").
230. E.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 7 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
231. See Koh, supra note 2, at 2366.

2004]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

2293

attempt-without going through Congress first-to gut a statute as
old as the Constitution itself. Of course, one was a unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court applying the "better angels" of
American constitutional principle, and the other was decided by a
three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, applying international law as
incorporated into a then-obscure statute. But the principal difference
in my view is that international human rights litigation has no
Thurgood Marshall. Brown was the result of a centrally planned
strategy, carefully executed over decades. International human rights
litigation in the aftermath of Fildrtiga is a "buzzing, blooming
confusion," in which the potential for massive recoveries has led to the
filing of cases that may trigger to a backlash where only the costs of
the ATS-and not its value-get attention.
Alvarez-Machain II offers a modest, crucial, and timely
endorsement of the Fildrtiga paradigm. The Court criticized not a
single final decision under the ATS, other than the Alvarez-Machain
litigation itself, and cited with approval a number of decisions that
adhere to Fildrtiga's principles. Its dicta regarding the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights were unnecessary and potentially damaging, but
the internal contradiction between that dicta and the Court's approval
of Fildrtigasuggests that the lower courts need not share or replicate
the Supreme Court's peculiar hostility to international law. Perhaps
the best that can be said is that Alvarez-Machain I was not the
international human rights movement's Brown, but it did avoid being
the movement's Plessy v. Ferguson.
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ANNEX
The Human Rights Abuse Compensationand DeterrenceAct
An Act to carry out obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Charter and other international agreements
pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil
action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in
violations of treaties of the United States and customary international
law.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of American in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "The Human Rights Abuse
Compensation and Deterrence Act."
SECTION 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION.
Any individual who suffers a tort in violation of a treaty of the
United States or of customary international law- including genocide,
slavery or slave trade, extrajudicial killing, causing the disappearance
of persons, torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes, arbitrary
detention, 232 or other gross violations of internationally recognized

232. The proposed statute adopts the international standards governing arbitrary detention,
but the definition is also sufficiently expansive to include state-sponsored transboundary
abductions. The executive branch, in settings other than its litigation positions in AlvarezMachain I and II, has consistently recognized that extraterritorial abductions by government
agents violate international law. The former Legal Advisor to the Department of State testified
before Congress that "[florcible abductions from a foreign state clearly violate this principle" of
sovereignty and that "the United States has repeatedly associated itself with the view that
unconsented arrests violate the principle of territorial integrity." FBIAuthority to Seize Suspects
Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Jud. Comm.,
101st Cong. (1989) [hereinafter "Oversight Hearings"]. When the Soviet Union attempted to
kidnap a Soviet citizen within the territory of the United States, the State Department, drawing
on the customary understanding among states, declared that "the Government of the United
States cannot permit the exercise within the United States of the police power of any foreign
government." 19 DEP'T OF STATE BULL.1948, at 251. Similarly, the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel, addressing a hypothetical strikingly similar to the Alvarez-Machain incident
ten years before the fact, concluded that "it appears to be the case that a forcible abduction, when
coupled with a protest by the asylum state, is a violation of international law." Extraterritorial
Abduction by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal Couns. 543 (1980). There is
no evidence that the Department of Justice or any other Executive department has repudiated
this conclusion as a matter of international law. See Oversight Hearings, supra, at 20-21 (Barr
statement), at 34-37 (Sofaer statement). The Barr Opinion, 13 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 195,
concluded that the President or the Attorney General has the authority under U.S. domestic law
to order the extraterritorial arrest of foreign criminal suspects, even though such an arrest would
be in violation of principles of customary international law. The opinion, however, accepts the
premise that state-sponsored abductions in foreign countries violate international law and
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human rights-or his or her estate, survivors, heirs, or representative,
has a cause of action and may sue therefore in any appropriate district
court of the United States.
SECTION 3. LIABILITY.
(a) Individual liability-An individual, either natural or
juridical, shall be liable for a tort in violation of a treaty of the United
States or of customary international law if that individual:
(1) intentionally commits such a tort, severally or jointly with
or through another actor, regardless of whether that other actor is
subject to the jurisdiction of the court;
(2) orders, solicits, or induces the commission of such a tort;
(3) aids, abets or otherwise materially assists in the
commission of such a tort with the knowledge that such assistance
will directly and substantially contribute to the commission of the tort;
(4) in any other way intentionally contributes to the
commission of such a tort by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose, if made with knowledge of the purpose of the group.
(b) Responsibility of commanders and other superiors.
(1) A military commander or person effectively acting as a
military commander shall be liable for torts as defined by this Act
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control,
or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his
or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
(A) that military commander or person either knew or, owing to
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such torts; and
(B) that military commander or person failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(2) With respect to superior and subordinate or contract
relationships not described in paragraph (1), a superior shall be liable
for torts as defined by this Act committed by subordinates or
contractors under his or her effective authority and control, as a result
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates
or contractors, where:
(A) the superior either knew, or, owing to the circumstances at
the time, should have known, or consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates or contractors were
committing or about to commit such torts;

concludes that nothing in U.S. constitutional or statutory law necessarily bars such abductions if
ordered by the President. Id. No such order was made in the abduction of Alvarez-Machain.
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(B) the torts concerned activities that were within the effective
responsibility and control of the superior; and
(C) the superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
SECTION 4. LIMITATIONS.
(a) Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies.- A court shall decline to
hear a claim under this Act if the claimant has not exhausted
adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct
giving rise to the claim occurred.
(b) Statute of Limitations.- No action shall be maintained
under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after the
cause of action arose. This section shall not apply to actions based on
claims that are not subject to limitations under international law.
(c) Forum non conveniens.- The district court shall not dismiss
any action brought under section 2 of this Act on the grounds of the
inconvenience or inappropriateness of the forum chosen, unless (1) the action may be maintained in a foreign court that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over all the defendants; and
(2) that foreign court is significantly more convenient and
appropriate; and
(3) that foreign court offers a remedy which is substantially the
same as the one available in the courts of the United States.
The court may grant relief under this subsection subject to any
condition(s) it deems appropriate.
SECTION 5. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.
Any civil action under section 2 of this Act against any
individual may be brought in the district court of the United States for
any district where any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.
SECTION 6. DEFINITIONS.
(a) GENOCIDE-For the purposes of this Act, the term
"genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, as such:
(1) killing members of the group;
(2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
(5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
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(b) SLAVERY or SLAVE TRADE.- For the purposes of this Act:
(1) the term "slavery" means the status or condition of a person
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
are exercised, including but not limited to:
(A) debt bondage, or the status or condition arising from a
pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a person
under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as
reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt
or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited
and defined;
(B) serfdom, or the condition or status of a tenant who is by
law, custom or agreement bound to live and labor on land belonging to
another person and to render some determinate service to such other
person, whether for reward or not, and is not free to change his status;
(C) any institution or practice whereby:
(i) a woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her
parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) the husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the
right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise;
or
(iii) a woman on the death of her husband is liable to be
inherited by another person;
(D) any institution or practice whereby a child or young person
under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural
parents or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or
not, with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of
his labor.
(E) forced or compulsory labor, or knowingly providing or
obtaining the labor or services of a person (1) by threats of serious
harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another person;
or (2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the
person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or
physical restraint; or (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of
law or the legal process;
(2) the term "slave trade" means and includes all acts involved
in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce
him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a
view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or
exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged;
and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves by whatever
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means of conveyance.
"Slave trade" also includes trafficking in
persons.
(A) For purposes of this Act, "trafficking in persons" shall mean
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
(i) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (b)(2)(A) of this
section shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (b)(2)(A) have been used.
(ii) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or
receipt of a child or young person under the age of 18 for the purpose
of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even if this
does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (b)(2)(A)
of this article.
(c) TORTURE.- For the purposes of this Act:
(1) the term "torture" means any act committed by an
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of
any foreign nation, directed against an individual in the offender's
custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental
to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing
that individual for an act that individual or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or
coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged or intense
mental harm caused by or resulting from(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the
personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or

2004]

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

2299

(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
(d) EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLING.- For the purposes of this Act, the
term "extrajudicial killing" means a deliberate killing, committed by
an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation, not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under
international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a
foreign nation.
(e) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.- For the purposes of this Act,
an individual is liable for committing a "crime against humanity"
when, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, commits any of
the following predicate acts:
(1) murder;
(2) extermination, including the intentional infliction of
conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a
population;
(3) enslavement, meaning the exercise of any or all of the
powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes
the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children;
(4) deportation or forcible transfer of population, meaning
forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without
grounds permitted under international law;
(5) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty
in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(6) torture, meaning the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or
under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions;
(7) rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity, where "forced pregnancy" means the unlawful
confinement, of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out
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other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in
any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy;
(8) persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined
in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court, where "persecution" means the intentional and severe
deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by
reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;
(9) enforced disappearance of persons, meaning the arrest,
detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time;
(10) other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health.
(f) WAR CRIMES.- For the purposes of this Act, the term "war
crimes" means grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property
protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(1) willful killing;
(2) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments;
(3) willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
health;
(4) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly;
(5) compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power;
(6) willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected
person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(7) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(8) taking of hostages.
(g) ARBITRARY DETENTION.- For the purposes of this Act, the
term "arbitrary detention" means a detention of an individual not
pursuant to law. A detention is arbitrary if it is supported only by a
general warrant, or is not accompanied by notice of charges; if the
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person detained is not given early opportunity to communicate with
family or to consult counsel; or is not brought to trial within a
reasonable time.
(h) GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
HUMAN RIGHTS.- For the purposes of this Act, the term "gross

violations of internationally recognized human rights" means serious,
persistent, or systematic violations of those rights that are universally
accepted and that no government would admit to violating as state
policy.

